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Summary 
In 2005 the United Nations International Law Commission released the 
report Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
diversification and expansion of International Law. Although fragmentation 
of international law had been a topic of discussion long before 2005 the 
report really made the debate take off, becoming one of the most debated 
issues in recent years among international law scholars. Interestingly the 
discussion has largely neglected the fact that for something to be 
fragmenting, it has to at one point been a unified whole, and in the case of 
international law, a legal system. 
 
This thesis picks up the discussion at a stage where legal scholars are trying 
to find different approaches on how to systematize international law. Two of 
the most prominent approaches are institutional and normative 
constitutionalism, which both are aspiring to become the hegemonic 
explanatory theory under which international law, can be perceived as a 
quantifiable one legal system. The institutional constitutionalists are trying 
to identify single constitutional documents, which can act as a universal 
constitution of the world, while the normative constitutionalists are arguing 
that there exist objective superior norms from which all international law 
seeks its legitimacy. These two approaches however are in the thesis 
critically investigated and found not only to be internally challenged from 
within the very legal theory they are based in, but also by the external 
transformation of contemporary international law. 
 
International law has long been perceived as being merely a set of rules 
generally regarded and accepted as binding in relations between states. 
However, the thesis shows that the sovereignty of states in recent years has 
eroded and that the importance of international organizations and 
transnational actors for guiding the normative and cognitive expectations of 
actors within the international sphere has grown. In the thesis it is therefore 
argued that the concept of international law is not adequate to fully 
understand the contemporary international normative environment and that a 
shift to the wider concept of global law therefore is necessary.  
 
However, the shift of concepts does not provide any answer as to the 
systemic nature of the international normative environment. To understand 
how global law has systematized itself into self-referential internally 
differentiated systemic entities the theory of Societal Constitutionalism is 
introduced. With the help of this theory it is explained how global law 
encompasses a numerous of differentiated normative international legal 
spheres. These spheres are by self-reference producing and reproducing 
themselves in accordance with their own rationale, without being a part of a 
larger systemic entity. From this position fragmentation is not a 
phenomenon isolated to international law, but an effect of the changes to 
society in large. 
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Sammanfattning 
2005 släppte Förenta Nationernas folkrättskommission rapporten 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
diversification and expansion of International Law. Även om 
fragmenteringen av folkrätten hade varit ett diskussionsämne långt före 
2005 fick rapporten verkligen debatten ta fart och fragmentering att bli en av 
de mest omdebatterade frågorna under senare år bland folkrättsjurister. 
Intressant är dock att diskussionen i stort har försummat det faktum att för 
att något ska kunna fragmenteras, måste det vid ett tillfälle varit en helhet, 
och i fallet folkrätten, ett rättssystem. 
 
Denna uppsats tar vid diskussionen i ett skede där jurister försöker hitta 
olika metoder för hur man kan systematisera folkrätten. Två av de mest 
framstående tillvägagångssätten är institutionell och normativ 
konstitutionalisering. Dessa båda teorier strävar efter att bli den 
dominerande teorin enligt vilken internationell rätt kan uppfattas som en 
kvantifierbar rättsordning. De institutionella konstitutionalisterna försöker 
identifiera enskilda konstitutionella dokument, som kan fungera som en 
universell grundlag för världen, medan de normativa konstitutionalisterna 
argumenterar att det finns objektiva överordnade normer från vilka all 
folkrätt legitimeras. I uppsatsen undersöks dessa två teorier dock kritiskt. 
Författaren finner att de inte bara utmanas internt av den juridiska teori de 
grundar sig på, men också av den transformation folkrätten på den senaste 
tiden genomgått på grund av yttre omständigheter. 
 
Folkrätten har länge endast uppfattats som en uppsättning regler som i 
allmänhet betraktas och accepteras som bindande i förhållandet mellan 
stater. I uppsatsen visas det dock att statssuveräniteten på senare år har 
eroderats och att internationella organisationer och transnationella aktörer i 
allt större utsträckning styr de normativa och kognitiva förväntningar bland 
de olika aktörer som existerar inom den internationella sfären. Författaren 
argumenterar därför att konceptet folkrätt inte är adekvat nog att förstå den 
samtida internationella normativa miljön och att en övergång till det bredare 
konceptet global rätt därför är nödvändigt. 
 
Däremot ger övergången från ett koncept till nästa inte något svar på frågan 
om den internationella normativa miljöns systematiska natur. För att förstå 
hur den globala rätten har systematiserat sig i självrefererande internt 
differentierade systemiska enheter så introduceras teorin om Societal 
Constitutionalism. Med hjälp av denna teori förklaras hur den globala rätten 
omfattar ett flertal normativt differentierade internationella rättssystem. 
Dessa rättssystem producerar och reproducerar sig själva genom själv-
referering helt i enlighet med sin egen logik. Detta gör de utan att vara en 
del av en större systemisk enhet. Från denna position är fragmenteringen 
inte ett fenomen isolerat till folkrätten, utan en effekt av förändringarna av 
samhället i stort. 
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Abbreviations 
ECHR  European Convention of Human Rights 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights 
EU  European Union 
IACHR  Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
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1 Introduction  
In 2000, at its fifty-second session, the International Law Commission 
(hereinafter ILC) decided to include a new topic into ILC’s long-term 
program of work, namely “Risks ensuing from the fragmentation of 
international law”.1 The phenomenon of international law fragmenting was 
not a new concept; it was in fact raised as an issue as early as the 1950’s.2 
Since, the discussions surrounding fragmentation have mainly focused on 
the concept as a problem concerning conflicting norms, the proliferation of 
international courts and in extension conflicting jurisprudential 
interpretations of international norms.3 
 
This thesis however is not aimed at solely discussing the emerging problem 
of conflicting norms or differentiated treaty interpretation; instead the aim is 
also to address fragmentation from a more abstract perspective, namely 
whether or not norms, figurative as international law, in the international 
sphere can be understood as constituting a legal system. The purpose of 
investigating the systemic nature of international law is that the connotation 
of the term fragmentation implies a holistic view of international law. 
Furthermore it implies that international law has gone from a state where it 
at one point could be perceived as an integrated whole, to a shattered state. 
Described as such a state one cannot speak about international law as one, 
or, a system, but rather a collection of rules or systems, with no other 
commonalities than that they operate in the international sphere outside the 
boundaries of the legal system of the nation-state and to a certain extent 
affect each other due to the solitary fact that the different rules or systems 
pertains to regulate the conduct of the same actors, namely states. 
 
The systemic nature of law has been discussed since the concept of law was 
introduced. However, ever since law was transferred from being applicable 
solely under the auspice of a physical person, the sovereign monarch, to a 
certain territorially defined area, the state territory, difficulties arose. In 
particular, it has been difficult to elaborate on theories how to understand 
and conceptualize the law that was supposed to apply between sovereigns.4 
Legal philosophers have not to any significant extent elaborated on this 
issue since the concept of natural law was abandoned.  
 
Moreover, international law has long been perceived as being merely a set 
of rules generally regarded and accepted as binding in relations between 
                                                
1 UN, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Fifth Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/55/10), chap. IX.A.1, para. 729. 
2 Jenks, Wilfred C., ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, British Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 30, pp. 401-453, 1953, p. 403. 
3 See among others, ILC, Fragmentation of international law: Difficulties arising from the 
diversification and expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, 2005. 
4 Agnew, John, ‘Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary 
World Politics’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 95, No. 2, pp. 
437-461, 2005, p. 439. 
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states. However, in recent time the sovereignty of states has eroded and the 
importance of international organizations and transnational actors for 
guiding the normative and cognitive expectations of actors within the 
international sphere has grown. With this in mind, it is both questionable 
whether international law can be framed holistically as a single legal system, 
but also if international law is a suitable conceptual tool in which the 
contemporary international normative environment could be framed in. 
 
In investigating these issues this thesis will largely discuss the dichotomies 
of national/international, public/private, territorial/non-territorial and 
universal/particular, in pursuit of a more satisfactory conceptual tool in 
which we can describe the inner workings of the contemporary international 
normative environment. 
1.1 Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to critically investigate how international law, 
described as a set of norms constituting a legal system, is being depicted in 
the judicial debate in light of the fragmentation discourse. The reason for 
doing so is that for international law to be fragmenting it necessitates a 
holistic perspective of international law. The authors thesis is that the 
systemic nature of international law is taken for granted by jurists and that 
the conceptual tools provided by traditional legal theory are incapable of 
describing the contemporary polycentric nature of the international 
normative environment. Therefore an alternative theory will be introduced, 
the theory of Societal Constitutionalism, which is based on Niklas 
Luhmann’s Autopoietic Social Systems theory. The introduction of Societal 
Constitutionalism will have the purpose of providing a framework in which 
the systemic complexity of the contemporary international normative 
environment might be observed and understood. 
 
For these purposes the following two questions will be asked: 
 
I) Is international law a legal system?  
II) Can the contemporary international normative environment be 
understood and explained as systemic by Societal 
Constitutionalism? 
1.2 Outline 
The essay, in addition to this introductory section, is divided into five 
chapters. Each chapter ends with a short conclusion, in order to clarify what 
in the chapter constitute the essentials. All chapters include both descriptive 
elements as well as the author’s own reflections. The reader should be aware 
of this. 
 
In chapter 2 the current understanding on the ontological systemic status of 
international law will be presented. The reason is to show the relevancy of 
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discussing matters of this kind as the methodology used by international 
lawyers depend on the stance one takes in this question. If international law 
is seen as a legal system, traditional legal method can largely be used. If it is 
not seen as a legal system, comparative legal method is a more suitable 
methodological tool in which to understand international law. 
 
Chapter 3 will deal with how international courts and tribunals as well as 
international law commentators have depicted and systematized 
international law. The stances taken will be investigated critically to 
understand if their descriptions support the current opinion on the 
ontological systemic status of international law and how strong these 
arguments are. Traditional legal method will be used to criticize these 
positions with some reference to legal philosophy. 
 
After this chapter the thesis will shift focus in chapter 4 to present the 
common understanding of international law as jus gentium, law of nations, 
and raise critique towards this concept, as it might not reflect the current 
normative environment of the international sphere. This is largely a 
descriptive chapter in which theories of various proponents of both state-
centrism and polycentrism will be presented. However, the conclusion will 
present what the author believes to be a more suitable concept to describe 
the contemporary international normative environment. 
 
Chapter 5 will be a ponderously theoretical section that will present Societal 
Constitutionalism and Autopoietic Social Systems Theory as an alternative 
theoretical tool to understand law as a social system and how the 
international normative environment have become increasingly 
differentiated into sectors due to the emergence of polycentric global law. 
 
Chapter 6 will present a summary of the continuous conclusions made 
throughout the thesis as well as providing the authors own opinion on the 
systemic status of international law. 
 
1.3 Methodology and Material 
Discussions on whether or not something is to be considered scientific or 
non-scientific have troubled philosophers throughout time and it is of value 
to at least touch upon the issue in writing an academic thesis. However, the 
discussion will not go deep into questions relating to ontology and 
epistemology. A brief discussion on certain issues relating to the distinction 
between descriptive and normative research is however called for.  
 
According to Hume’s law one needs to strike a clear distinction between 
what is and what ought to be. Moral rationalism, according to Hume, do not 
belong to the field of science as one commits a logical fallacy by deriving 
an is from an ought.5 Why this according to the author of the thesis is 
                                                
5 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, Reprint, Nuvision Publications, 2007, p. 335. 
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important to note is that much of the scientific research conducted around 
the topic of fragmentation and constitutionalism is normative rather than 
descriptive. To answer the question is international law a legal system?, 
which is answer that is descriptive by nature; one cannot resort to normative 
arguments.6 With that being said, as this thesis will present a tool not 
commonly used within legal theory, normative arguments will be given as 
to why this theory’s explanatory power is better suited to conceptualize 
contemporary international law. The presented theory will then be used as a 
base to give an answer to the descriptive question of the ontological 
systemic status of the international normative environment. 
 
Moreover, there is a problem of presenting a method to be used in a thesis 
on this subject, since the methodology normally used by lawyers 
presupposes that the norms under investigation belong to and are 
systematized under the same legal system.7 However, this very 
presupposition is under scrutiny in this thesis. Therefore a set of theoretical 
frameworks under which the systemic nature of international law can be 
understood will be presented. The core arguments of the theories that are 
based on traditional legal theory will be investigated through examining the 
international law sources they refer to with the help of legal dogmatic 
method. Applying this method means separating legal rules from other 
norms in society.8  
 
Traditionally article 38 of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) 
statute provides ‘the’ authoritative list of such sources; however, principally 
this is due to the lack of any other list of sources.9 Among international 
conventions, international custom and general principles of law, also 
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations should be taken into account. 10 In reading the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists, or as they will be referred to 
throughout the thesis, academics, legal scholars and commentators, more of 
a legal analytical approach will be adopted. This method is usually not much 
different than traditional legal method, or what some call dogmatic legal 
method, however it rather reflects the nature of the investigation conducted 
in this thesis. It pertains to argumentation that is rather free and often 
formulated as a form of pro-et contra argumentation. As it is the system as 
such that is under scrutiny a rather functional approach will be taken to find 
                                                
6 See generally e.g., Klabbers, Jan, Peters, Anne & Ulfstein, Geir, The constitutionalization 
of international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Kadelbach, Stefan, Kleinlein, 
Thomas, International Law – A constitution for Mankind: An attempt at a re-appraisal with 
and analysis of constitutional principles, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 50, 
pp. 303-347, 2007. 
7 Peczenik, Aleksander, Juridikens teori och metod: en introduktion till allmän rättslära, 1. 
uppl., Fritze, Stockholm, 1995, p. 33. 
8 Hydén, Håkan, Rättssociologi som rättsvetenskap, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2002, p. 57. 
9 Prost, Mario, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law, Hart, Oxford, 2012, pp. 
92-93. 
10 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, United Nations, para. 38, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 [Accessed on: 2013-05-13]. 
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an answer to what the sources of normative quality are in the international 
sphere.11 
 
In chapter 5 an alternative theory will be presented, which is believed to 
give a more satisfactory answer to the ontological question posed in this 
thesis. It is partly descriptive and partly normative. Traditional legal 
methodology does in this matter not suffice as the theory criticizes 
international law for being a too restrictive concept to explain the 
contemporary international normative environment. Instead the 
investigation will turn to what is under article 38 of the ICJ statute referred 
to as the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. This part 
will however be conducted solely with the legal analytical method referred 
to above. 
1.4 Delimitations of the study 
Dealing with the systemic nature of international law is sort of the 
international legal equivalent of establishing the meaning of life within 
philosophy or theology, all-inclusive and non-exclusive.12 Besides treating 
the presented theories a bit roughly, due to the spatial confines that one has 
to follow in writing a masters thesis, a few intentional delimitations have 
inevitably been done. 
 
There are an abundance of different constitutional theories within the 
constitutionalization discourse. However, instead of elaborating on all of 
them only the two most referred to theories will be presented in this thesis. 
Furthermore, other theories pertaining to explain international law as 
systemic units, which are divided under other headings than 
constitutionalization will neither be discussed. An example of such a theory 
is international institutional law. 
 
Within legal philosophy, hypothesis on how to conceptualize law or legal 
systems are plentiful. For the sake of this thesis none of these theories will 
be dedicated its own chapter as most of them pertain to explain legal 
systems in the purely national sphere. However, in some parts references 
will be made to some of the most influential legal theorists. The same goes 
for the concept of law, which is closely connected to the concept of a legal 
system. The thesis will to a large extent discuss the dichotomy of 
public/private in relation to norm creation, however it is not possible within 
the given side count to elaborate thoroughly on theories pertaining to 
explain the true nature of law. 
 
The concept of a quantifiable unit will be central to the thesis and 
distinguished from the concept of qualitative unity. Although desirable from 
                                                
11 Sandgren, Claes, ’Är Rättsdogmatiken Dogmatisk?’, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, Vol. 
04-05, p. 648-656, 2005, p. 655. 
12 Not saying that questions regarding law bears an equal meaning to those regarding life.  
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the perspective of making the distinction between the two clear, it is not 
viable to fully elaborate on the concept of qualitative unity. 
1.5 Definitions 
1.5.1 International Law 
In a thesis on international law it is necessary to define what is meant by the 
concept the thesis purports to investigate. The terminological predecessor of 
international law, jus gentium (law of nations), lacked the ambiguousness of 
international law and was rather clear in what legal subjects the norms and 
rules applied to, namely between states.13 The two concepts are nowadays 
used interchangeably.14 One can however argue if not the ambiguousness in 
the term international law actually reflects the current ambiguous state of 
affairs of norms in the international sphere, as it has evolved from being 
solely applicable to treaty agreements between states to pointing out a 
variety of norms, such as rules, principles and custom, and legal subjects, 
such as natural persons, legal persons and international organizations. 
 
However, international law is commonly understood as a set of rules 
generally regarded and accepted as binding in relations between states and 
nations. Or as expressed in the Lotus case by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ): 
 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of 
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as 
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement 
of common aims.15  
 
The interesting term in such a definition is the word ‘binding’, which can be 
deduced from the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda.16 It means that 
what constitutes international law is norms which are considered binding 
upon states by those states. Therefore from a conceptual view no other 
norms can be considered international law. 
 
Furthermore, international law is mostly used in a manner, presupposing the 
existence of an international legal system. It is therefore not the ideal term to 
use for the sake of this thesis. However, the term will be used, as it is the 
most widely known term to conceptualize non-national law. Throughout 
                                                
13 “International law” was first introduced by Jeremy Bentham in 1789: Bentham, 
Jeremy, An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, Batoche Books, 
Kitchener, 2000, p. 236. 
14 Weston, Burns H. (red.), International law & world order: basic documents, 
Transnational Publishers, Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y., 1994-, p. 19. 
15 PCIJ, S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 7 September 1927, 
para. 44. 
16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 1155, p. 331, Article 26. 
 10 
most of the thesis, the concept of norms in the international sphere and the 
international normative environment will be used somewhat 
interchangeably, however, implying that international law is something 
more than just binding rules between states. In some instances where it is of 
importance to differ between those who use international law presupposing 
systematics and those who don’t, the concept of norms in the international 
sphere and the international normative environment will be used to 
illustrate those who are not presupposing systematics. 
 
Furthermore, public international law will also be used somewhat 
interchangeably to international law beside cases where it is necessary to be 
more specific in what international body of law is referred to. In its widest 
sense international law will be used to purport all non-national law, 
notwithstanding its contractual or non-consensual nature. 
1.5.2 Norms 
Since the term norms was introduced in distinguishing those who use 
international law presupposing the systemic nature of international law and 
those who do not it is of importance to also define norms. The term will in 
this thesis refer to the collective expectations of the actors in the 
international society, notwithstanding their origin or status. As such the 
definition can follow along the following lines: 
 
A principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving 
to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior.17 
1.5.3 Global Law 
Global law is a modern concept developed due to the fact that international 
law cannot be considered conceptually mirroring all those norms that guide 
normative and cognitive expectation of actors in the international sphere. It 
purports to reflect the development of norms in the international sphere, not 
only in the narrow sense of international law, but also rules and norms 
between states and non-state actors, private international law and rules and 
norms between non-state actors who act in the international sphere. The 
foremost example of the latter is lex mercatoria, which is the law that 
derives from international contract practice.18 
1.5.4 Systems and Legal Systems 
From an ontological perspective, systems, like all concepts, are purely a 
figure of thought, a cognitive creation, and in extension a construction of 
language. The term as such is unquestionably one of the most used terms 
                                                
17 Merriam-Webster, Norms, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/norms 
[Accessed: 2013-05-15]. 
18 For elaboration on the concept, see generally, Le Golf, Pierrick, ‘Global Law: A Legal 
Phenomenon Emerging From the Process of Globalization’, Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 119-145, 2007. 
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within, as well as outside, science and enjoys different meanings under 
different circumstances and for different people.19 It is therefore important 
to begin by introducing a semantic definition of the noun system. 
 
Oxford Dictionaries: “A set of things working together as parts of a 
mechanism or an interconnecting network; a 
complex whole”20 
Oxford Dictionaries: ”A set of principles or procedures according to 
which something is done; an organized scheme or 
method” 21 
Cambridge 
Dictionaries Online: 
”A set of connected things or devices which operate 
together”22 
Merriam-Webster: ”A regularly interacting or interdependent group of 
items forming a unified whole”23 
 
Whatever definition of the term one joins, it stands clear that a phenomenon 
perceived as a system would have to feature a set of things, principles or 
procedures, devices or items, which are in some way connected and by the 
connection forms a unified whole. Ackoff has structured the needed 
elements in the following way: 
 
1. Each element has an effect on the functioning of the whole.  
2. Each element is affected by at least one other element in the system. 
3. All possible subgroups of elements also have the first two 
properties.24 
 
Laszlo and Laszlo have, inspired by Ackoff, thus made the following 
definition of a system: 
 
[A] group of interacting components that conserves some identifiable set of 
relations with the sum of the components plus their relations (i.e., the system 
itself) conserving some identifiable set of relations to other entities (including 
other systems).25 
 
As the observant reader probably already noted, the definitions of the term 
as well as the proposed definitions of the concept of a system share a few 
                                                
19 Klir, George J., Facets of systems science, 2. ed., Kluwer/Plenum, New York, 2001, p. 4. 
20 Oxford Dictionaries, System, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/system 
[Accessed on: 2013-02-10]. 
21 Oxford Dictionaries, System, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/system 
[Accessed on: 2013-02-10]. 
22 Cambridge Dictionaries Online, System, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/system_1?q=system [Accessed on: 2013-
02-10]. 
23 Merriam-Webster, System, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/system 
[Accessed on: 2013-02-10]. 
24 Ackoff, Russel L., Creating the corporate future, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1981, 
pp. 15-16. 
25 Laszlo, Ervin, Laszlo Alexander, ‘The Contribution of the Systems Sciences to the 
Humanities’, Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 5–19, 1997, p. 
8. 
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characteristics. Put in the context of law it consists of two or more elements 
(laws, principles etc.), which through its behavior and structure (content of 
elements, the interpretation of those elements) can produce effects (legal or 
persuasive force), separately or interconnected, on either the separate 
elements; the interconnected whole (legal system) or other interconnected 
wholes (legal systems). 
 
Conceptualizing systems this way makes it highly significant to touch upon 
the concept of a unit (or whole) and how this differs from the concept of 
unity. The concepts are often used interchangeably with a devastating result 
to the logic of the conclusion. The failure lies in the fact that the former is 
related to the quantification of entities, while the latter relates to the quality 
of such units. While qualitative unity can spring from a quantitative unit, a 
quantitative unit can never be conceptualized out of mere qualitative unity. 
If connected to the abovementioned definitions, unit refers to the whole, 
while unity refers to interconnectedness.  
 
However, as a unit is an empty container only referring to something that 
amounts to the quantitative number of one, what we conceive as a unit is 
highly dependable on what we are aspiring on quantifying. For example 
physical phenomenon such as a stone or a tree are easy to conceptualize as 
units. However, if we speak about social systemic units, such as a family, or 
legal systems, unity depends on how we define such social systemic units. 
This is also where the problem of quality and quantity arise.26 
 
It means that the term system can be used to describe different kinds of legal 
systems. For example it can be used in relation to all treaties dealing with 
human rights, which then can be referred to the ‘human rights system’. 
Although all human rights treaties might be considered existing for the 
teleological purpose of protecting certain human rights, it does not 
necessarily mean that the content, the interpretation and implementation of 
that content will be the same in every treaty environment. Equal teleological 
purpose does so to speak not imply that something belongs to the same 
system. The same reasoning can be applied to other teleological equal 
bodies of law. There are a multitude of treaties dealing with trade for 
example. Most of them work in accordance with the teleology of market 
liberalization, however they all have their own norms, which exist in 
isolation of each other.27 This means that similarities can be found in the 
interpretation and implementation of the norms, but they apply in different 
settings and intend to regulate the conduct between different actors. For a 
                                                
26 The qualification of tree and stone units can pose serious issues as well. What is the 
difference between a bush and a tree, how many branches can be cut of before the tree 
looses its unity? When does a pebble turn from being merely a pebble to being a stone, and 
to what extent can the stone be crushed before the pieces becomes small enough to loose 
their quality as a stone? These questions must however be left aside for others to dwell on. 
27 See generally e.g. Ito, Takatoshi, Rose, Andrew K., eds., International Financial Issues 
in the Pacific Rim: Global Imbalances, Financial Liberalization, and Exchange Rate 
Policy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008. 
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quantified legal system to exist there therefore need to exist more than just 
teleological unity among norms that act in the same conceptualized sphere.28 
 
If we were to conceptualize the social unit of a family, most people would 
not question that two persons, a man and a woman, living in the same 
structural unit (house, apartment, etc.), being intimate with each other and 
towards society presents themselves as an economic unit, are a family.29 If 
these two persons would produce an offspring, the family unit would evolve 
and the offspring would become a part of the conceptualized family unit. 
Units can so to speak evolve over time. However, if we introduce a different 
third person, another man for example, one would start to question where 
the family unit begins and ends and where other social units, such as the unit 
of a residential community, or the unit of a circle of friendship, take over as 
more suitable descriptions. The quantification of a social unit is so to speak 
highly dependable on that certain qualitative criteria are being met. This 
necessarily gives that for the sake of investigating international law as a 
legal system, or legal systems generally referred to as international law, it is 
necessary to investigate what constitutes the quantitative unit of a legal 
system and what qualitative elements it entails. 
 
Legal philosophers have throughout the existence of law elaborated on such 
elements, although mainly focusing on highly homogeneous national legal 
systems. Hobbes for one believed that the legal system was that of a 
hierarchical relationship between the sovereign and the people, effectively 
making the legal system under the sovereign to be defined not territorially 
but demographically.30 Austin perceived law of a legal system as command 
given by a sovereign supported by a sanction, likewise demographically 
defined.31 Kelsen’s a priori logical methods dealt only with the formal 
composition of legal systems, which meant that law was a strictly 
hierarchical order (stufenbau) with a meta-norm on top (grundnorm) 
validating law.32 Hart on the other hand believed legal systems to be a 
“union of primary and secondary rules”,33 with the rule of recognition as the 
validating meta-norm.34 Both Kelsen and Hart cared more on defining the 
inner workings of the legal system rather than how to distinguish between 
different quantified legal systems. Kelsen did however rely on the law-
creating organs as the principal distinguishing feature.35 Finally Raz who 
                                                
28 For a thorough examination on the complexity of unity, see Prost, 2012. 
29 There are a huge amount of elements, which defines this relationship, but the presented 
elements will suffice to make the point. 
30 Nergelius, Joakim (red.), Rättsfilosofi: samhälle och moral genom tiderna, 2. uppl., 
Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2006, pp. 37-38. 
31 Austin, John, The province of jurisprudence determined and the uses of the study of 
jurisprudence, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1954, pp. 9-33. 
32 Kelsen, Hans, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory: A Translation of the First 
Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law, Clarendon, Oxford, 1996[1992], p. 
65. 
33 Hart, H. L. A., The concept of law, Clarendon, Oxford, 1961, p. 96. 
34 Simmonds, Nigel E., Juridiska principfrågor: rättvisa, gällande rätt och rättigheter, 
Norstedt, Stockholm, 1988, pp. 88-89. 
35 Raz, Joseph, The concept of a legal system: an introduction to the theory of legal system, 
2nd ed., Clarendon, Oxford, 1980, p. 192. 
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believed that legal theorists in using legal systems “forge a conceptual tool, 
[..] which will help him to a better understanding of the nature of law”.36 
The unifying identity of a legal system entails two concepts according to 
Raz. These concepts are the formal and material unity, and it is only the 
formal unity that forms the identity of the legal system.37 However, to 
distinguish between two legal systems that both claim validity and that are 
both efficacious within the same society (e.g. the international society) he 
introduces the test of exclusion. One factor of special importance in this test 
is “the efficacy of major constitutional laws”, the system that comes out the 
best in a comparative test is according to Raz the existing legal system.38 
 
Of all these above presented legal philosophers, only Kelsen believed in the 
systemic nature of international law. However, Kelsen perceived 
international law and national law as a single monistic39 system, a stance 
that do not find much support among states or in contemporary legal studies.  
 
Thus, as far as legal philosophy is concerned there are only vague 
conceptions of what actually constitutes a legal systemic unit and what 
distinguishes one legal systemic unit from another. This is especially true 
regarding the international normative sphere and this thesis will instead of 
adopting a strict legal philosophical approach in identifying systematics deal 
with how legal scholars and practitioners have depicted the systemic nature 
of international law in the light of legal philosophy. This will be conducted 
in chapter 3. 
1.5.5 Fragmentation 
One of the core concepts of this thesis is that of fragmentation. The term is 
not a technical legal term and the concept has not yet been conceptually 
stabilized in the legal discourse. Therefore it will not be possible at this 
stage to define the concept. However, to large extent it stands out as a 
rhetorical approach to criticize the current state of international law. From 
this perspective it can in very broad terms it can be said to be a metaphor 
used to articulate the interplay between proponents of diversity and unity.40 
 
                                                
36 Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Clarendon, Oxford, 
1979, p. 79. 
37 Ibid., p. 80. 
38 Ibid., p. 208. 
39 Monism, is a philosophical concept where the variety of things are explained in terms of 
singularity. In legal theory it implies that international law and national law belong to the 
same singular system. From a practical point of view it means that as soon as a state signs a 
treaty it immediately becomes binding on that state. Dualism, is the antonym of monism, 
and denotes a state of two. In legal theory it implies that international law and national law 
are two mutually exclusive systems of law. From a practical point of view it means that a 
State must ratify, through its internal legislative mechanisms, a signed treaty before it 
becomes binding on that State. 
40 Martineau, Anne-Charlotte, ‘The Rethoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in 
International Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 1-28, 2009, p. 
5. 
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The term itself applies roughly to “the act or process of fragmenting”,41 with 
fragment meaning ”a part broken off or detached”.42 
1.5.6 Other Definitions 
Throughout the thesis certain concepts will be used that are not as important 
to define in this opening chapter as the concepts above. In case these 
concepts need clarification, definitions will be found in footnotes in close 
relation to the coined concepts. 
                                                
41 Merriam-Webster, Fragmentation, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fragmentation [Accessed on: 2013-05-13]. 
42 Merriam-Webster, Fragment, http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/fragment 
[Accessed on: 2013-05-13]. 
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2 Overview – How the Systemic 
Nature of International Law 
has been Depicted in the 
Fragmentation Debate 
The following chapter will outline how the systemic nature of international 
law has been depicted in the judicial debate over the supposed fragmented 
state of international law. The reason for doing so is to illustrate the need of 
resolving the ontologically formulated question ‘is international law a legal 
system?’, as the legal theoretical methodology used by legal scholars and 
practitioners to observe law heavily depend on whether or not the 
observations are being conducted within or outside the supposed legal 
system. 
 
The language used in relation to the concept of fragmentation, as a basis for 
criticism of the current state of international law, has been traced as far back 
as 150 years.43 Fragmentation as a separate discipline of study, and of 
anxiety, can be traced as far back as the 1950’s when Wilfred C. Jenks 
highlighted issues relating to the proliferation of international law as a 
problem, arguing that: 
 
These instruments inevitably react upon each other and their co-existence 
accordingly gives rise to problems which can be conveniently described, on 
the analogy of the conflict of laws, as the conflict of law-making treaties.44 
 
However, not all commentators are pursuing this anxious approach towards 
fragmentation. Therefore these different perspectives will be presented 
below under headings divided into those who share this anxious view, those 
who approach fragmentation from a positive perspective and those who are 
altogether hesitant towards the systemic nature of international law. 
2.1 The Perspective of the Anxious 
In recent years the concept of fragmentation has been depicted as a post-
modern anxiety among international legal scholars and practitioners. The 
source of the anxiety is mostly believed to derive from the material 
expansion and densification of rules, and the proliferation of institutions and 
courts, in the international sphere,45 which for jurists’ who appreciate the 
                                                
43 Martineau, 2009, p. 2. 
44 Jenks, 1953, p. 403. 
45 See generally, Koskenniemi, Martti, Leino, Päivi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp 553-579, 
2002. 
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benefits of systematics of legal rules, is seen as an imminent threat.46 Prost 
believes that the anxiety is not only due to the increasing number of rules, 
but can also be seen as a result of a broadened international legal 
community.47  
 
Since the mid 1980’s as the Cold War era ended the anxiety started to 
intensify. Brownlie was one of the anxious first, when he in 1988 argued 
that: 
 
A related problem is the tendency to fragmentation of the law which 
characterizes the enthusiastic legal literature. The assumption is made that 
there are discrete subjects, such as 'international human rights law' or 
'international law and development'. As a consequence the quality and 
coherence of international law as a whole are threatened (...) A further set of 
problems arises from the tendency to separate the law into compartments. 
Various programmes or principles are pursued without any attempt at co-
ordination. After all, enthusiasts tend to be single-minded. Yet there may be 
serious conflicts and tensions between the various programmes or principles 
concerned.48 
 
Hafner, who triggered the work of the ILC49, argued that “[t]he 
disintegration of the legal order jeopardizes the credibility, ability, and, 
consequently, the authority of international law”.50 Benvenisti and Downs 
showcase a more realistic anxiety, claiming that powerful states with 
hegemonic ambitions intentionally is driving international law to a 
fragmented state, arguing that: 
 
[T]he functional specialization and atomistic design of fragmentation are, at 
least in part, the product of a calculated effort on the part of powerful states 
to protect their dominance and discretion by creating a system that only they 
have the capacity to alter.51 
 
Probably among the most notable of the anxious are the two former 
presidents of the International Court of Justice, Judge Guillaume, who 
expressed concerns after the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia 
(hereinafter ICTY) case of Tladic, stating that; 
 
[T]he proliferation of international courts gives rise to a serious risk of 
conflicting jurisprudence, as the same rule of law might be given different 
interpretations in different cases. This is a particularly high risk, as we are 
                                                
46 Benvenisti, Eyal, ‘The Conception of International Law as a Legal System’, German 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 50, pp. 393-405, 2008, p. 10. 
47 Prost, 2012, p. 4. 
48 Brownlie,Ian, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law’, p. 15 in: Crawford, 
James (red.), The Rights of peoples, Clarendon, Oxford, 1988. 
49 See his, Hafner,Gerhard, Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No.10, UN Doc. 
A/55/10, 2000, p. 321-339. 
50 Hafner, Gerhard, ‘Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 849-864, 2004, p. 856. 
51 Benvenisti, Eyal, Downs, George W., ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy 
and the Fragmentation of International Law’, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 
595-631, 2007, p. 625. 
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dealing with specialized courts, which are inclined to favour their own 
disciplines.52 
 
And the somewhat more moderate Judge Schwebel; 
 
Concern that the proliferation of international tribunals might produce 
substantial conflict among them, and evisceration of the docket of the 
International Court of Justice, have not materialized, at any rate as yet.53 
 
Many more commentators have raised the issue and most books published 
on the subject of international law nowadays contain at least one sub-
chapter dedicated to the subject of fragmentation. Almost exclusively these 
authors purport fragmentation as problematic for the continued unified 
existence of the international legal system. 
 
In conclusions, those who take on an anxious view towards fragmentation 
are without exception commentators that do not question the systemic 
nature of international law, but instead presuppose it. 
2.2 The Perspective of the Optimists 
All do not however represent this negative attitude towards the 
fragmentation of international law. Some even question the truthfulness of 
the postulate. Neoliberal legal theorists’, like Charney, actually perceive 
fragmentation and the rise of interpretive bodies as a gradually evolving 
solution to the demands globalization imposes on the international legal 
system, where efficient decentralized processes are preferred to centralized 
processes. Charney believes the pluralist diversity of alternative, multiple 
forums, of international adjudication and arbitration he believes to outweigh 
the possible adverse consequences contributing to less coherence in 
international law.54 He states that: 
 
I encourage all to embrace and nurture them so that they may fulfill their 
laudable objectives. We should celebrate the increased number of forums for 
third-party dispute settlement found in the Convention [Law of the Sea] and 
other international agreements because it means that international third-party 
settlement procedures, especially adjudication and arbitration, are becoming 
more acceptable. This development will promote the evolution of public 
international law and its broader acceptance by the public as a true system of 
law.[..]Hierarchy and coherence are laudable goals for any legal system, 
including international law, but at the moment they are impossible goals. The 
benefits of the alternative, multiple forums, are worth the possible adverse 
                                                
52 Address by H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice 
to the United Nations General Assembly, 26 October 2000, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=84&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1 [Accessed on: 2013-04-19]. 
53 Address by H.E. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, President of the International Court of 
Justice to the United Nations General Assembly, 26 October 1999, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=87&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1&PHPSESSID= [Accessed on: 
2013-04-19]. 
54 Charney, Jonathan I., ‘The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement 
Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea’, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 69-75, 1996, pp. 73-75. 
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consequences that may contribute to less coherence. This risk is low and the 
potential for benefits to the peaceful settlement of international disputes is 
high.55 
 
He later reiterated this position and concluded that the ongoing cross-
fertilization promotes uniformity of international law and improves its 
quality, “an increase in the number of international tribunals appears to pose 
no threat to the international legal system”.56 Other legal institutional 
theorists, like Burke-White, stresses the importance of growth of 
international institutions and do not perceive fragmentation as a solution, 
but rather as an acceptable implication that follows from the diversity of 
forums in which an inter-judicial dialogue can take place. He states that: 
 
This dialogue has important implications for the unity of the international 
legal order as it provides actors at all levels with means to communicate, 
share information, and possibly resolve potential conflicts before they even 
occur. This interjudicial dialogue has been relatively well documented and 
occurs at three distinct levels. Supranational courts are engaged in dialogue 
with one another, national courts are citing to supranational courts, and 
national courts are in direct conversation with one another.[..]The 
significance of this interjudicial dialogue cannot be overstated, for it has the 
potential to preserve the unity of the international legal system in the face of 
potential fragmentation.57 
 
Simma, although not positive as such towards the concept of fragmentation, 
takes on an optimistic view in how to cope with fragmentation. He argues 
pragmatically that the actors of international law, states, international 
organizations and international courts, share the intention of upholding the 
unity of the international legal system. International law, he argues, is 
therefor only seemingly fragmenting.58 Similarly Koch argues that it is in 
the interest of the actors of international law, due to the fact that the 
legitimacy of the system as such is at stake, to not allow the situation to get 
out of hand.59 
 
The tendency among these commentators with an optimistic view upon the 
supposed fragmentation of international law does neither, alongside the 
anxious, seem to question the systemic nature of international law  
                                                
55 Charney, 1996, pp. 74-75. 
56 Charney, Jonathan I., ‘Is International Law Threatened by Multiple Tribunals?’, p. 110-
115, in: Recueil des cours / Académie de Droit International = Collected courses of The 
Hague Academy of International Law, 1998, Vol. 271, Martinus Nijoff, Leiden; Boston, 
1999. 
57 Burke-White, William W., ‘International Legal Pluralism’, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 963-980, 2004, p. 971-973. 
58 Simma, Bruno, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’, 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 265-297, 2009, p. 279. 
59  Koch Jr., Charles H., ‘Judicial Dialogue for Legal Multiculturalism’, Michigan Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 879-902, 2003, pp. 901-902. 
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2.3 The Perspective of those who Hesitate 
Beside the doomsayers and the irreversible optimists, there are some authors 
that are actually questioning the supposed systemic nature of international 
law. These authors care more for a unified application of international law 
and less about systemic unity. Pierre-Marie Dupuy sees international law as 
an underdeveloped legal system, which is not at present under threat from 
fragmentation. The ideal state of the global judicial system would be to have 
a corresponding normative and institutional hierarchy. Such a system he 
believes, in line with Simma, can be realized if international judges are 
convinced that the unity of international law is a desirable state.60 
 
Koskenniemi, who chaired the International Law Commission’s study group 
on fragmentation, expresses almost unconcernedly in a post-constructivistic 
manner that: 
 
[T]he proliferation of autonomous or semi-autonomous normative regimes is 
an unavoidable reflection of a 'postmodern' social condition and a beneficial 
prologue to a pluralistic community in which the degrees of homogeneity and 
fragmentation reflect shifts of political preference and the fluctuating 
successes of hegemonic pursuits.61 
 
Koskenniemi reiterated this position in a later article, developing his 
argument around the primitiveness, abstractness and political nature of 
international law. His perception of international law is not as a legal 
system, but rather a combination of a normative and political system, 
developed out of diplomatic mores rather than a unified legislative will of 
states.62 
 
Michaels and Pauwelyn also identifies the primitiveness of international law 
and concludes that international law “is not a full-fledged system”,63 but 
does not imply that the shortcomings of the system lead to anarchy; instead 
they see it as a “more sophisticated legal landscape”.64 Their answer to the 
ontological question is that international law is both a system and not a 
system, on different levels, and that the answer depends on which legal 
interpretive techniques that is the most efficient at a particular level.65 
 
                                                
60 Dupuy, Pierre-Marie, ‘The Unity of Application of International Law at the Global Level 
and the Responsibility of Judges’, European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1-
20, 2007, p. 1. 
61 Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘What is International Law For?’, p. 52 in: Evans, Malcolm D. 
(red.), International law, 3. ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. 
62 Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics’, Modern Law Review, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 1-30, 2007, pp. 1-2. 
63 Michaels, Ralf, Pauwelyn, Joost, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different 
Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law’, Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 349-376, 2012, p. 375. 
64 Ibid., p. 376. 
65 Ibid., pp. 375-376. 
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Santos peculiarly approaches the question on this sophisticated legal 
landscape, which he instead refers to as legal plurality, from a concept he 
terms inter-legality. He states: 
 
[T]he impact of legal plurality on the legal experiences, perception and 
consciousness of the individuals and social groups living under conditions of 
legal plurality, above all the fact that their everyday life crosses or is 
interpenetrated by different and often contrasting legal orders and legal 
cultures.66 
 
This more sociological approach to systematics is of interest for the latter 
part of the thesis. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The majority of commentators in the debate, as it has been depicted above, 
refer to international law in such a way that legal systematics is for the most 
part assumed. From this presupposition fragmentation out of logic necessity 
becomes an undesirable state; especially for jurists’ who are accustomed to 
interpret and apply norms in such a way that systematics is sustained. 
Besides Charney, who indeed acknowledges the systemic nature of 
international law and that it is fragmenting, and to some extent Burke-
White, all authors depict the ongoing fragmentation as having negative 
effects on this proposed system. There are only a few commentators that 
question the presupposition as such. 
 
Peculiar for the debate is that that it is sprung out of a context where the 
international sphere is becoming increasingly judicialized. Maybe the 
foremost examples of successful judicalization in the international sphere 
are the development of judicial bodies dealing for example with human 
rights, but also the progression of regional bodies such as the European 
Union (hereinfafter: EU) and issue-specific bodies like the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter: WTO). Seen from such a position fragmentation 
then becomes an almost oxymoronic notion, where increasing juridification, 
which is positive seen from the side of the jurist, is leading to the unraveling 
of law as we know it, which undoubtedly is highly problematic from a legal 
perspective.  
 
Desirability can however also be deduced from the fact that in analyzing the 
current legal position of international law, the interpretations of case law 
from international courts, as well as state treaty making, presuppose the 
conception of one international legal system. For example the popular 
doctrinal comparison between the test of effective control elaborated by the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case67 with the test of overall control elaborated by the 
ICTY in the Tadic case merely becomes a question of theoretical academic 
                                                
66 Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, Toward a new legal common sense: law, globalization and 
emancipation, 2. ed., Butterworths LexisNexis, London, 2002, p. 97. 
67 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, I.C.J. Reports, 1986, pp. 64-65, para. 115. 
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relevance if the ICJ and the ICTY is concluded belonging to separate legal 
systems.68 
 
At the same time as the anxiety over a fragmenting state of international law 
get downplayed by legal technical ways to cope with the non-cohesiveness, 
a new type of anxiety is unraveling.69 The state-centric perception of 
international law is increasingly challenged and new international legal 
subjects emerge, the natural person, international organizations and legal 
persons.70 The newly developed complexity of the international sphere, or if 
one will, the polycentric globalization, is to a large extent an unaccustomed 
task for the international, as well as national, legal applier71 to cope with.72 
 
International law is not the only legal regime that is affected by the 
supposed fragmentation. The theoretical turn of fragmentation does not 
relate much to national law, however the way the legal applier and 
practitioner interpret national law are to an almost equal extent affected by 
the supposed fragmentation, foremost by the effects of disintegration of 
sovereignty that follows with it. With the state concept under threat, the 
boundaries defining the national legal order is jeopardized, and seen from 
the perspective of the fragmentation debate, no theories seems ready for this 
post-statecentric era. Or phrased in a Derridian sense; the anxiety can be 
traced to the fact that there is no longer any nation-state or sovereign that 
can act as a “guarantor of right”.73 
 
From this outline it can be concluded that there is no answer to the question 
on the systemic nature of international law. Nor can one find any 
consistency among academics in the debate on the supposed fragmented 
state of international law. The thesis will instead turn to how international 
law scholars are trying to systematize international law. 
                                                
68 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement of 15 July 1999, p. 49, 
para. 120. 
69 The ILC study group shifted the debate through introducing interprative techniques to 
overcome conflicting norms, see, ILC, A/CN.4/L.682, 2005. 
70 For a thorough examination of individual persons as legal subjects of international law, 
see, Parlett, Kate, The individual in the international legal system: continuity and change in 
international law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2011. 
71 Legal applier is someone who in their profession apply law, let it be a judge or a 
governmental official. 
72 Teubner, Gunther, ‘Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the 
Nation State’, p. 330 in: Dobner, Petra & Loughlin, Martin (red.), The twilight of 
constitutionalism?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. 
73 Jacques Derrida as quoted in: Orford, Anne, ‘Critical Intimacy: Jaques Derrida and the 
Friendship of Politics’, German Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 31-42, 2005, p. 33. 
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3 Approaches to the 
Systematization of 
International Law  
“International law is a legal system.”74 This ontologically formed postulate, 
articulated by the ILC in their conclusions on the topic of fragmentation of 
international law, clearly illustrates the prevailing conviction on how 
international law is construed as a quantitative unit. However desirable this 
ontological stance may be for the international lawyer, it is necessary to 
investigate how this notion has been formed in the judicial debate, as well as 
how it can be criticized. 
 
Prost has described the doctrinal debate on the subject as being developed in 
two waves. The first generation has focused on the question of functional 
autonomization of special regimes and the multiplication of international 
tribunals, while the second generation has assumed coherence and unity of 
international law as legitimate goals and presented juridical technical 
solutions to the alleged fragmentation.75 However, this chapter identifies 
three distinct waves in which the systemic nature of international law has 
been developed in the doctrinal debate. Those are Prost’s two waves, which 
will be dealt with under the epithets of self-contained legal regimes and 
legal technical normative integration, along with the unifying theories of 
universal constitutionalism. 
3.1 Self-Contained Legal Regimes  
As indicated above the notion of international law as a legal system has not 
been uncontested in the academic debate. One of the most prominent 
arguments against international law being one legal system has been the 
possible existence of so-called self-contained regimes. The term self-
contained refers to something that is “complete, or having all that is needed, 
in itself”,76 and the term regime refers to, “a system or ordered way of doing 
things”.77  
 
The basis for the concepts existence can be found in the jurisprudence of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter: PCIJ), which referred 
to “self-contained” in describing the relation between different rules of the 
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same treaty,78 and the ICJ, which has referred to “self-contained regime” in 
the relationship between different legal regimes.79 Later ICTY in the Tadic 
case also referred to a similar concept, stating that, “[i]n international law, 
every tribunal is a self-contained system (unless otherwise provided)”.80 
Also the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) have long considered 
the treaty constituting the EU as a separate legal system, however without 
referring to any of the above-mentioned concepts. Already in the cases of 
Costa v. ENEL and van Gend en Loos the court concluded that the European 
community should be considered having ”created its own legal system”,81 
which ”constitutes a new legal order of international law”.82 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: IACHR) has not ventured as 
far, however stating its independence as an institution.83 
 
As there is no unified approach on how to understand self-contained 
regimes in the case law of international courts and tribunals, the concept 
will be referred to as self-contained legal regimes and the thesis will instead 
turn to the doctrinal debate on the subject. 
3.1.1 The doctrinal debate 
The foremost proponent of the self-contained legal regimes concept is 
Willem Riphagen who was Special Rapporteur on the topic of state 
responsibility in the ILC in the beginning of 1980’s. In his report to the ILC 
he concluded that regimes could in principal be self-contained if they by a 
complete, implied or explicit, set of secondary rules permanently excluded 
all general rules on state responsibility in order to ascertain, interpret or 
implement the substantive primary rules of the regime.84 He stated that: 
 
In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, international law as it stands today 
is not modelled on one system only, but on a variety of interrelated sub- 
systems, within each of which the so-called "primary rules" and the so-called 
"secondary rules" are closely intertwined—indeed, inseparable.85 
 
Riphagen’s self-contained regimes would effectively mean that in the 
international sphere, multiple competing legal regimes of equal rank would 
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exist.86 Many authors have held that this construct is of purely theoretical 
value and some even go as far as stating that two or more states signing a 
treaty do so automatically and out of necessity within the system of 
international law.87  
 
The ILC have tried to differentiate between different expressions of 
normative self-containment, describing them as narrower and wider 
concepts.88 However, it seems that conceptualizing self-containment as a 
continuum, rather than divided into clear categories is preferable.89 Factors 
that most commonly are referred to when designating a system as self-
contained relate to the rules of responsibility, the administration of rules and 
the interpretation of rules, which according to Agius deals “with the 
understanding of rules, the validity and applicability of rules and the effect 
of rules”.90 
 
In the ILC report the opinion was raised that no treaties exist in a vacuum,91 
even in the case of the ‘most’ self-contained regimes in the international 
sphere, as the respective judicial bodies that overlook these treaties, the 
WTO Appellate Body, the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECtHR) on a regular basis apply rules of general customary 
international law.92 The ILC study group went as far as stating that: 
 
No legal regime is isolated from general international law. It is doubtful 
whether such isolation is even possible: a regime can receive (or fail to 
receive) legally binding force (“validity”) only by reference to (valid and 
binding) rules or principles outside it.93 
 
At the same time Judge Meron at the opening of the ECtHR in January 2013 
reiterated the stance taken by his own court, the ICTY, in the Tadic case 
stating: 
 
Yet, while this Court and the ICTY stand apart as distinct, self-contained 
systems, the relationship between international courts such as ours—and 
between human rights law and other parts of international law—is far more 
nuanced than our separate structures might at first suggest.94 
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While Simma and Pulkowski believe that the EU almost have attained full 
self-containment, there are still potential scenarios in which a fallback on 
the rules on state responsibility found in public international law is 
necessary. This means that according to two of the foremost proponents of 
the concept, the most developed international legal regime cannot (yet) be 
considered a self-contained legal regime.95 The same applies to the WTO, 
which despite its rules that prohibits states from having parallel recourse to 
claims for compensation and/or countermeasures under public international 
law, WTO have not completely decoupled from the very same.96 
3.1.2 Discussion 
Approaching the case law of the international courts and tribunals on the 
subject of self-containment, or a legal order of a sui generis character, can 
be oddly confusing, particularly in view of the differentiated terminology 
used by the international courts. 
 
The concept is furthermore controversial, as it has its roots in a 
particularistic view on international law, which by universalists are 
considered a great threat to the unity of the alleged international legal 
system. Observing the scholarly debate, it can easily be described as 
conceptual exclusion. Self-contained legal regimes challenge the prevailing 
self-descriptive and self-reflexive contemporary idea of especially 
international law, particularly common among public international lawyers, 
and in a way jeopardizes the very structures in which these legal 
practitioners operate. 
 
Put unkindly, the loss of the preferential right of interpretation for the public 
international lawyer in matters of international law, have made the very 
same lawyer lose its power over the continued development of international 
law, and as such its previous relevance. The foremost representative of such 
anxiety is the former President of the International Court of Justice, Judge 
Guillaume, who stated, “[S]pecialized courts […] are inclined to favour 
their own disciplines”.97 However, the direct opposite can be said about 
Judge Guillaume and the ICJ. 
 
The widened agenda of the international sphere as well as the growing 
number of legal subjects in international law, which is owed to the regimes 
often pointed out as self-contained, have required jurists to specialize in 
concrete and materially differentiated international legal disciplines. 
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Together with the fact that these self-contained, or specialized, regimes 
more take the form of functioning legal systems of their own, draws 
attention from public international law to these specialized branches. 
International law all of the sudden becomes comprehensible, binding, 
enforceable, remedial, even going as far as putting individual criminals in 
prison. 
 
At the same time it seems like the establishment of new fragmented regimes 
create obligations for states “without or against their will”.98 With enforcing 
power that relies on functional imperatives that can be ascribed to different 
systems such as economy, trade, human rights, criminal law, etc. According 
to Holmes, “these interest-based ‘cognitive’ orders assume the form of legal 
regimes in their own right that encompass even the fields of former national 
law and politics”.99 
 
Although these functional regimes work under different imperatives it does 
not necessarily have to threaten a unitary application of law that exists in the 
international sphere, as will be shown in the next sub-chapter. Such 
principal unification in the interpretation of existing primary norms in the 
international sphere does not in itself give proof on the ontological stance 
whether international law is to be considered a single system or not.  
 
However, as concluded above, none of these regimes are presenting a full 
set of secondary norms and are as such difficult to conceptualize as 
completely self-contained from a legal theoretical point of view. Beside a 
group of judges of the ECJ and the ICTY, there are not many who believe 
that any of the current specialized legal regimes have attained full self-
containment from public international law.  
 
From this conclusion the thesis will move on to the next section that will 
deal with the approach of the constitutionalist. 
3.2 Towards Universal Constitutionalism 
Almost as a reaction to the discussion on self-contained regimes 
commentators have tried to systematize international law as one legal 
system under a universally applicable constitution. The basic assumption is 
that international law has evolved from a state where state sovereignty, 
consensualism and non-use of force were the organizing principles, to where 
the international legal order rather can be characterized in constitutional 
terms.100  
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Before embarking on the substantial argumentation of universal 
constitutionalists it is appropriate to take a second to reflect over the 
terminology that is being used. Constitution and constitutionalism bears 
different meaning. The former is a derivate of the national legal systems’ 
concept of a hierarchically superior constitutional document. The latter 
however refers to the theory and practice pertaining something to be 
constitutional.101 Constitutionalism is moreover a multidimensional concept, 
or as Walker phrases it, “polymorphic”, of which two types are going to be 
dealt with in this thesis, namely that of institutional constitutionalism and 
normative constitutionalism.102 
 
The way one should understand constitution in the international sphere is 
just as that of the constitution in national law. National law is in a way 
fragmented with specialized legal spheres and functional regimes, like 
criminal law, environmental law or administrative procedures with the 
constitutional law holding it together by hovering above the other branches 
of law, hierarchically.103 Thus, the multifariousness of international law, 
according to Kadelbach, does not have to exclude the possibility of 
transferring the concept of a constitution to the international sphere, as 
incoherence can also be found in state constitutions.104 Meaning that 
fragmentation might be problematic from the perspective of unifying the 
application of international law, but not as threatening the quantitative 
international legal systemic unit. 
 
It is also argued that the term constitution not necessarily needs to be 
reserved for the supreme law of the sovereign state and presuppose the 
existence of a constitutional demos.105 However, most constitutionalists 
frame their argument around the existence of an international legal 
community.106 Tomuschat argues that a common international constitution 
has nothing to do with any concept of a super-state entity. States have 
established a considerable number of institutions, which have effectively 
eroded state sovereignty, and thus the requirement of state consent, creating 
an international community, which stands in between the traditional 
sovereign state and a world of hierarchical order.107 The admittedly failed 
process of establishing a constitution of Europe is a prime example of such 
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challenges to the concept that constitutions are exclusively a domestic law 
concept.108  
 
As previously indicated, international constitutionalism can be depicted in 
several different ways depending on how one understands constitutionalism. 
There have been several attempts to describe single treaties as constitutional 
documents of the international sphere, among them the UN charter.109 
Others have described the constitutionalization of international law as a 
spontaneous process of treaty making, institutional practice and political 
norms, forming a constitutional pattern, a sort of common law-like 
constitution.110 However, the rationale behind all international 
constitutionalization theories is to move beyond interpreting international 
rules contractually and instead interpret them constitutionally, meaning that 
all rules must be compatible with the basic principles of the international 
legal system.111 It also aspire to limit the possibility of states to opt-out of 
any contractual relationship that they might engage in,112 which ultimately 
has to do with international law’s autonomy.113 
 
Although several constituationalist theories are being discussed, this sub-
chapter intends to deal with the two most prominent approaches. The first 
being one which identifies norms of a constitutional character within public 
international law, institutional constitutionalism, and the second which 
analyzes positive international law and emphasizes the emergence of 
objectively existent superior norms, independent of state consent, normative 
constitutionalism. 
 
Constitutionalists, no matter institutional or normative, base their theories, 
either implicitly or explicitly on three assumptions. (i) Constitutions can 
exist beyond the nation state, (ii) that there exist a certain degree of unity in 
the international sphere, and (iii) that this constitutional order is universal. 
As such, undermining either assumption would suffice to invalidate the 
concept. 
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3.2.1 Institutional Constitutionalism 
The institutional constitutionalist fraction seeks to legitimize identified 
power centers in the international sphere and the most popular theory 
identifies the United Nations (hereinafter: UN) as such a center and argue 
for the UN Charter as the constitutional document.114 
 
Possibly the foremost contemporary proponent of the theory is Fassbender. 
He frames his constitutional argument around the Kelsian concept of a 
hierarchically superior norm, which binds all states. An ideal type of 
constitution, according to Fassbender, should apply without exception to all 
members of the community it purports to govern, in this case the entire 
international legal community.115 Fassbender applies a functional approach 
to the principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, where the sovereign 
right of a state exists under international law, not as a concept outside 
international law. While the pacta tertiis-principle would exempt non-
member states from being bound by the UN Charter, sovereign equality of 
states is highly dependable on the foundational principles of the UN, like the 
prohibition of the use of force.116 Or as Kelsen frames it: 
 
[i]f the [UN] Charter attaches a sanction to a certain behaviour of non-
Members, it establishes a true obligation of non-Members to observe the 
contrary behaviour.117 
 
This effectively means, according to Fassbender, that no international law 
exists independently alongside the UN Charter, which in that sense forms 
the constitutional umbrella under which the whole body of international law 
endures.118 This constitutional umbrella does not only provide a protection 
of the autonomy of member states, but also a protection for the autonomy of 
non-member states.119 Habermas is furthermore a proponent of this idea and 
states that the UN Charter,  
 
is a framework in which UN member states must no longer understand 
themselves exclusively as subjects bringing forth international treaties; they 
rather can now perceive themselves, together with their citizens, as the 
constituent parts of a politically constituted world society.120 
 
Support for the argument is derived from article 103 in the UN Charter, 
which reads: 
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
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other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail. 
 
The provision extends the priority of obligations under the UN Charter to 
any treaty, present or future, as well as agreements with non-member states, 
and the international sphere thus becomes hierarchically differentiated.121 
Since obligations under the charter can arise through Security Council 
resolutions in accordance with article 25 of the UN Charter, other 
obligations than those present in the charter itself may become binding on 
states in the future, which limits their sovereign treaty making powers. 
 
A serious blow to this theory has indeed been the two ECJ cases of Yusuf 
and Kadi, where the ECJ were faced with reviewing a Security Council 
resolution adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The ECJ did not 
invalidate the resolution under scrutiny in the cases, however it found that 
the ECJ could test the legality of such resolutions122 as well as invalidate 
them if found violating existing jus cogens norms.123 This approach adopted 
by the ECJ has largely gone uncontested and it therefore effectively 
undermines any theory of the UN Charter as a universal constitutional 
document for the international sphere. 
 
The idea of the UN Charter as the constitution of international law has been 
criticized also elsewhere and can instead of a fully elaborated separate 
theory be seen as a base for the more contemporary concept of 
constitutionalization presented in the next section.124 
3.2.2 Normative Constitutionalism 
This pluralist constitutionalization theory is firmly based in classic 
liberalism and suggests that values that the international community regards 
as universal forms the constitutional umbrella under which rules in the 
international sphere can be seen constituting a legal system. Rules of such 
dignity expressing such values is quite rare in international law, however 
proponents of normative constitutionalism have identified norms which are 
considered jus cogens and obligations erga omnes as having such dignity. 
The idea is that these ‘basic’ rules, in principal, is of a non-consensual 
character and that states are bound to them irrespective of their will.125 As 
the respective function and content of these norms are advisable to recall for 
a proper assessment of the theory I will briefly introduce these concepts. 
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Jus cogens norms, also called peremptory or non-derogable norms, have a 
normatively superior character to other international norms through positive 
international law.126 This means that jus cogens norms are beyond the reach 
of state treaty-making competence, no matter bilateral or multilateral,127 as 
well as unilateral.128 The definition laid down in the Vienna Convention is 
also wide enough to include any acts other than treaties.129 Any reservations 
in violation of a peremptory norm are also to be considered void.130 From 
such a point of view it appears as if the norm-creating character of state 
consent and also of bilateral and multilateral reciprocity is restricted by the 
non-derogable nature of jus cogens norms.131 However clear the definition 
of the concept as such might be, it is highly uncertain which norms 
constitute jus cogens norms. Some authors have even referred to the jus 
cogens regime as “exceptionally fuzzy” due to this fact.132 The ICJ, the 
ICTY and the ECtHR have concluded that the prohibition against torture is 
a norm of such dignity.133 The ICJ has affirmed that genocide belongs to 
this category.134 Other norms that have been proposed to have that dignity 
is, the right to state self-determination, the prohibition of aggression, 
enslavement, racial discrimination and crimes against humanity.135 
 
Erga omnes obligations as a legal concept of international law gained 
recognition through the ICJ’s use of the term in the Barcelona Traction case 
from 1970. The court distinguished between the obligations of a state 
towards the international community as a whole, and those borne towards 
other individual states.136 The concept has also been recognized by the ILC 
in their draft articles on state responsibility where a distinction is drawn 
between breaches of bilateral obligations and obligations of a collective 
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interest.137 Obligations erga omnes is therefore to be considered 
hierarchically superior to other norms of a non-peremptory character.138 
However, it is unclear whether or not this is due to their substance, the 
importance of the values expressed, or due to the non-reciprocal legal 
relationship these norms create between the right holder and the obligated 
party.139 The right of peoples to self-determination140 and the rights and 
obligations enshrined in the Genocide convention has been pointed out by 
the ICJ as obligations erga omnes.141  
 
There is no apparent and clear distinction between jus cogens norms and 
erga omnes obligations and many scholars have regarded them as 
interchangeable.142 However, in the ILC’s report on fragmentation it is 
claimed that jus cogens norms have to do with the normative weight of the 
norm and erga omnes obligations with the procedural scope, and while a jus 
cogen norm of necessity is an obligation erga omnes, the opposite is not 
necessarily true.143 
 
Due to the normative power of these norms and obligations they effectively 
form the constitution of the international sphere, which states are bound to 
irrespective of their will. As Tomuschat phrases it: 
 
[A] class of legal precepts which is hierarchically superior to “ordinary” rules 
of international law, precepts which cannot even be brushed aside, or 
derogated from, by the sovereign will of two or more states as long as the 
international community upholds the values encapsulated in them.144 
 
However, the normative power and reach of these norms can indeed be 
questioned. Although both the ECtHR and the ICJ have recognized torture 
and genocide as jus cogens norms145, they did not make them operational in 
the specific cases due to the special nature of state immunity146 and lack of 
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state consent to ICJ jurisdiction.147 However, in the Al-Adsani case, six 
judges joined in a dissenting opinion stating that: 
 
For the basic characteristic of a jus cogens rule is that, as a source of law in 
the now vertical international legal system, it overrides any other rule which 
does not have the same status. In the event of a conflict between a jus cogens 
rule and any other rule of international law, the former prevails. The 
consequence of such prevalence is that the conflicting rule is null and void, 
or, in any event, does not produce legal effects which are in contradiction 
with the content of the peremptory rule.148 
 
Later the ICJ confirmed the majority standing in the Congo v. Rwanda case 
that a jus cogens norm does not affect the customary international law on 
state immunity. In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, the ICJ argued that 
the two sets of rules address different matters. One is of a procedural 
character, while the other is of a material matter, such rules can according to 
ICJ not be in conflict of each other.149  
 
The courts’ decisions to omit the primacy of jus cogens norms are 
disappointing to all those who argue that international law are developing 
under a constitutional framework, which limits are set by fundamental rules. 
As dissenting Judge Cançado Trindade framed it in the Jurisdictional 
Immunities case: 
 
As to national legislations, pieces of sparse legislation in a handful of states, 
in my view, cannot withhold the lifting of state immunity in cases of grave 
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law. Such are 
positivist exercises leading to the fossilization of international law, and 
disclosing its persistent underdevelopment, rather than its progressive 
development, as one would expect. Such undue methodology is coupled with 
inadequate and unpersuasive conceptualizations, of the kind of the ones so 
widespread in the legal profession, such as, inter alia, the counterpositions of 
“primary” to “secondary” rules, or of “procedural” to “substantive” rules, or 
of obligations of “conduct” to those of “result”. Words, words, words . . . 
Where are the values?150 
 
Another issue, which deserves attention, is the theoretical possibility of a 
conflict between two norms with equal superior normative power. Brownlie 
rather ironically states: “If a state uses force to implement the principle of 
self-determination, is it possible to assume that one aspect of jus cogens is 
more significant than another?”151 Reading Linderfalk, one are struck by the 
even gloomier picture than the one presented above, as he questions the very 
existence of jus cogen norms altogether. He states that: 
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[J]us cogens is a term used for rhetorical purposes, but on closer analysis we 
should admit that in positive international law jus cogens norms simply do 
not exist.152 
 
However, he has not gone unquestioned. Zemanek argues that he is making 
the same mistake as Kelsen and relies on a too rigid normative legal method 
in identifying jus cogen norms, one that does not fit the nature of the 
international legal order.153 Christenson is more in line with Linderfalk and 
concludes that jus cogens 
 
is a normative myth masking power arrangements that avoid substantive 
meaning until later decisions, thereby both postponing and inviting political 
and ideological conflict.154 
 
He is however optimistic about the future of jus cogens as a potential 
normative public order that could guide international law.155 But such 
normative statements does not help us in determining whether or not 
international law as it stands today forms a unified whole. It rather takes the 
form of what Kleinlein is calling “meta-theory”.156 
3.2.3 Discussion 
The institutional constitutionalist approach seems to be undermined by the 
existence of norms such as jus cogens and obligations erga omnes, as the 
superiority of the UN Charter is dependent on the fact that Article 103 are 
acting as a Unitarian guardian of the world. Furthermore, the ECJ has 
affirmed that the UN Charter is not superior law in the EU if it breaches 
basic human rights, which creates equal tension between the two regimes as 
well as a potential non-uniform application of decisions based on the UN 
Charter. The approach furthermore suffers from the fact that the UN Charter 
can only create a sort of illusionary constitutional framework of the world, 
as it in reality is nothing more than an organizational constitution of an 
organization that now only de facto now have all states of the world as 
members. However, that is not necessarily a never-ceasing truth as 
membership is voluntary for the equally superior states of the world. 
Although some commentators that promote institutional constitutionalism 
believe that the international community must “get out of the fog”157 with 
the indistinct rhetoric of normative constitutionalism, the thesis will now 
move on to the latter. 
 
Normative constitutionalization due to the existence of jus cogen norms and 
erga omnes obligations are a more popular doctrinal approach. It is also the 
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preferred position if one wants to criticize international law from the 
perspective of fragmentation. However desirable this position might be, the 
jurisprudential power of rulings of several international courts strongly 
affirms that such a position is not a good description of the present state of 
international law. As international law stands today, it would, according to 
the rational of these courts, demand an emerging peremptory procedural 
norm, a secondary rule, derived from the substantive peremptory norm. In 
this case a so-called real norm conflict would arise. International courts 
would then according to their own rationale have to afford a certain 
substantive jus cogen norm primacy over, for example, norms of state 
immunity, which are then both secondary rules. However, if the jus cogens 
norm has a corresponding erga omnes obligation, which according to the 
ILC has to do with a norms procedural scope (secondary rule), there might 
just exists such a real norm conflict. Support for such an interpretation of 
erga omnes cannot be found within the case law of the international courts 
though. 
 
From a different perspective the same issue can be attacked with the 
argument that for a true hierarchy to be present in international law, two 
elements must be present, namely the element of identification and the 
element of nullity. If either of the two elements is missing, one cannot 
properly speak of a hierarchy of norms.158 From such a perspective jus 
cogens norms can neither be considered truly hierarchically superior as 
international courts in the process of identifying the hierarchically superior 
norm has failed. Phrased in the language of Hart, law itself must control the 
indeterminacy of law, meaning that the secondary rules of law are necessary 
to dispel any doubts of the meaning of primary rules.159  
 
In accordance to Hart’s legal theory160 the ICJ foremost have in accordance 
with the secondary rules of the supposed system determined that at least one 
of the supposed constitutional rules existing in international law is basically 
nothing more than a political canon. However, if one were to question the 
courts from the perspective of Dworkin, they have failed in their ability to 
adhere to the interpretive principle of integrity and as such have not 
regarded the principles guiding them in cases of norm conflicts.161 As the 
state immunity rules are not the expression of normativity, or moral, (no 
secondary rule can be), and the jus cogens norm are, it must out of necessity 
be the latter which is the principle that should guide the court in such a 
conflict. As Weisburd phrases it: 
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[O]f course, any legal system needs some standard against which the justice 
of its enactments is evaluated. The difficulty with the concept of jus cogens is 
that it purports to be, not a standard for evaluating law, but law itself.162 
 
One does not find much support for this normative position within the 
doctrinal debate however.  This to some extent shows the great influence 
Hart’s differentiation of rules and Hume’s law has on the trained 
international jurist. 
 
Furthermore, constitutionalization presupposes that law in general, and 
international law in particular, are inherently striving towards an ideal state 
where structure, hierarchy and coherence among rules reigns. This unveils a 
paradox, how can international law fragmentize and constitutionalize at the 
same time? This lends one to believe, as other authors have argued, that 
constitutionalism is essentially a discursive contest between scholars over 
not just the exact content of constitutionalism, but constitutionalism itself. 
Essential to this argument is that there is not one definition of 
constitutionalism, but rather different approaches on how one can 
understand constitutionalism in the international sphere. Some authors are 
argued to approach constitutionalism as an institutional concept, others as a 
mere theoretical concept, while some treat it as a political concept.163 The 
author of this thesis rather takes the side of the 2006 Conference of the 
European Society of International Law who said, “over the last few years 
the notions of “international constitution” and “international 
constitutionalism” have become real buzzwords in the legal discourse”.164 
 
From this conclusion the thesis will move on to the different approaches on 
how to uphold or disintegrate the qualitative unity of the supposed 
international legal system. 
3.3 Legal Technical Normative Integration  
An approach of a more pragmatic nature, which has had a burgeoning 
existence as of lately, is the systemic integration approach. Generally the 
proponents of this approach care less whether or not international law is 
fragmenting, but rather focus on methodologies how to reconcile the vastly 
differentiated rules that apply in the international sphere. Prost notes that 
this technical approach to the multiplicity of international law rather 
assumes that coherence and unity are legitimate goals, than questioning 
those very assumptions.165 Or in other words, they are trying to uphold the 
qualitative unity of the presumed quantitative unit. 
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Under this chapter I will also present a different technical approach, born 
out of the idea of systemic integration, that in the same way use conflict 
resolving methodology instead of taking an ontological stance to the 
question of the systemic nature of international law. 
3.3.1 Systemic Integration 
There are two underlying assumptions that validate the rationale of the 
argument. (1) That all rules in the international sphere receive their force 
and validity from general international law, and as such they must be 
interpreted against the background of principles of general international 
law.166 (2) If the point of international law is to coordinate interstate 
relations, it follows that specific norms must be read in the context of other 
norms that intend to regulate the very same facts as the specific norm.167 
 
The main argument of the proponents are that available legal techniques, 
such as lex specialis, lex superior and lex posterior, are perfectly capable of 
resolving any normative conflicts or overlaps that occurs among 
international law. Which out of the conflicting or overlapping provisions 
that should prevail over the other depend on aspects such as: 
 
[T]he will of the parties, the nature of the instrument and their object and 
purpose as well as what would be a reasonable way to apply them with 
minimal disturbance to the operation of the legal system.168 
 
The inferior norm is not invalidated through the interpretive technique, but 
either harmonized and rendered compatible with the superior norm, or given 
influential interpretative impact on the interpretation of the superior 
norm.169 This is done to realize the generally shared common objective, the 
systemic nature of the normative environment of international law.170 
 
There is no explicit legal basis for the principle of systemic integration, 
however it is argued that article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (hereinafter: VCLT) could be read as such. It reads: 
 
There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
[..] 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 
 
One ILC member, Xue Hanqin, has described the provision as the “master 
key” to the systemic relationship that exists in all international law.171 This 
effectively means that although a tribunal might only have jurisdiction in 
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regard to a particular treaty, it should take consideration to the normative 
environment that the treaty endures in.172 
 
Any relevant rules of international law, has been suggested to encompass 
rules from any formal source of international law.173 Traditionally article 38 
of the ICJ statute has provided the authoritative list of such sources, 
however, principally this is due to the lack of any other list of sources, as 
well as being a clause pointing out applicable law for the ICJ.174 
 
As such the VCLT, or rather the principle of systemic integration, as it is 
paraphrased in the VCLT, creates a sort of constitutional framework in 
which international law is operating in. Specialized regimes such as the 
European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR) and WTO 
should not be seen as systems, which operate outside general international 
law, instead it should be “read as an exception or an application of general 
law”.175 
 
Support for such a conclusion can be found in the jurisprudence of for 
example the ECtHR,176 the IACHR,177 the North American Free Trade 
Agreement arbitrational tribunal178 and the WTO Appellate Body,179 where 
public international law has been applied by these functionally defined 
judicial bodies in interpreting matters under their own regime. 
3.3.2 Differentiated Systemic Integrators 
The approach as the ILC study group phrased it has raised a lot of attention 
as well as critique among scholars and practitioners. One point of critique 
has been the belief in lex specialis and lex posterior as systemic integrators. 
Michaels and Pauwelyn is arguing that the lex specialis principle is 
grounded in a presumption that the will of the parties to a treaty is too 
specify an exception from a general rule, and in the case of lex posterior that 
the will is to preclude previous agreements on the same subject matter. Such 
a will is in most cases highly difficult to prove.180  
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In developing their argument, Michaels and Pauwelyn, is of the opinion that 
techniques used is dependent on whether or not one perceive international 
law as a system or not. If one perceives it as a system, a conflict-of-norms 
approach should be used, what they call intra-systemic rules. If it is not a 
system, a private international law approach is necessary, so called inter-
systemic rules. However, from a pragmatic perspective they deem it 
necessary, not to decide on the ontological nature of international law, but 
rather which rules work best for which context.181 The authors identify three 
different situations of norm-conflict: 
 
(1) In a conflict between general international law and treaties intra-
systemic rules, such as lex superior (for conflicts with jus cogens norms) 
and lex specialis (for conflicts between secondary rules) works well, due to 
the fact that this conflict resembles a conflict within a single legal system. 
They also conclude, “denying the systemic character of international law 
implies denying the existence of general international law”,182 which is 
necessary for their assumption that states conclude treaties bearing in mind 
general international law.183  
 
(2) In conflicts within one branch of international law, intra-systemic rules 
apply as well, referring to the principle of lex posterior in article 30(1) of 
VCLT that successive treaties relating to the same subject matter should 
prevail.184  
 
(3) In conflicts between branches of international law, or phrased 
differently, between functional sub-systems of international law however, 
intra-systemic rules does not function as well. Such rules are not designed 
for conflicts of the kind where environmental concerns conflict with trade 
concerns for example. These are by nature not really conflicting norms, but 
rather congruent norms, or so-called multi-sourced equivalent norms 
(hereinafter: MSEN).185 Since a violation of any of the congruent MSENs 
will engage state responsibility states need to act consistently, as well as that 
courts must presume state consistency when interpreting such norms.186 
Therefor inter-systemic rules, conflict-of-laws rules should be applied 
instead.187 However, examples of such rules are not overabundant,188 instead 
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courts should opt for an approach where they isolate the “real issue” at hand, 
as well as the object of the claim.189 
 
In the fragmentation report, this approach is not dealt with directly. 
However, it is touched upon under a different name, namely mutual 
supportiveness. This concept is slightly different, as it implies a balanced 
solution, a harmonizing interpretation, instead of isolation of the real issue 
at hand.190 The study group concluded that such conflict clauses would 
cause structural bias and the outcome depend on whichever tribunal’s task 
it was to interpret the conflicting regimes.191 Or as Shany purports it, 
“excessive coordination and harmonization with other regimes may dilute 
the normative and institutional impact of the courts own regime”.192 Pavioni 
is of another opinion and believes that the conciliatory reading mutual 
supportiveness enables can be the key principle governing inter-regime 
relations,193 and that the study group’s opinion rather constitutes an 
argument a fortiori.194 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Without a unifying legislative or interpretive body in international law, a 
multitude of problems arise when thousands of equally superior norms are 
concluded between equally sovereign entities. However, legal appliers have 
access to interpretive principles, which could in fact deal with the conflicts 
that arise from the diversification and proliferation of international law. The 
focus among legal scholars is elaborating on the formula, which could 
potentially be the key to deal with the supposed fragmentation.  
 
The rationale of these interpretative theories however is that systematics is 
reached and/or maintained through the absence of inconsistency among 
primary norms and decisions, which is considered as a situation of legal 
uncertainty. This appellate directly to Kelsen’s unity of a legal system, 
which is nothing more than non-contradictory body of law. 
 
However, with such ease one cannot conclude that rules belonging to 
different legal regimes constitute a system. In fact it would be utterly absurd 
to approach legal systematics form such a position. An easy example would 
suffice to shoot such an argument down. Having two norms, one belonging 
to the legal regime of Sweden and the other to the legal regime of Bhutan, 
both saying non-A, both being valid, if we apply the rationale of the 
argument above, these two norms would in fact belong to the same legal 
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system. If one argue from the perspective of Kelsen that would not be as 
absurd as Kelsen’s pure theory of law was monistic of nature. However, 
most theorists (as well as most states) of today do not believe in a single 
global monistic legal system, and as such the notion of non-contradiction 
among rules cannot in itself be an answer to the ontological question of one 
unitary system of international rules. Phrased differently, substantive 
coherence does not reach legal systemic unity; equally important is 
coherence among the systems secondary rules and such coherence is 
doubtful in the international sphere. Especially if looking at questions 
related to lex fori.195 As Nobles and Schiff is arguing, we need to move 
away from the Aristotelian idea that a system is merely the relationship 
between a whole and its parts. The debate over unity of law, they argue, 
“has been a kind of quest for the Holy Grail”,196 where “the ‘technicians of 
unity’ […] reduce international law’s unity to the twofold law of rule and 
conflict”.197 The concept of unity has to be differentiated from concept of a 
unit. As the former cannot in itself generate the latter, but one of the 
necessary elements of the latter is the former. 
 
In this sense what Michaels and Pauwelyn is stating is much more in line 
with the overrepresented dualistic reality of the legal world. Their 
conclusion that collisions of norms belonging to different legal 
regimes/spheres/branches are in fact better dealt with the help of inter-
systemic norms resembling those found within conflict-of-laws. The same 
applies to congruent, as well as equally superior and non-contradictory 
norms belonging to different regimes/spheres/branches. To some extent it 
proves that the current interpretive principles suffice in creating 
compatibility, however, it does again not prove either qualitative or 
quantitative unity. Instead it rather supports the idea that international law is 
just a political system framed in legal language. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The ongoing debate whether or not international law should be portrayed as 
one system or as a collection of many systems is undoubtedly highly 
perplexing. There seem to be three main waves of approaches in the debate: 
 
(1) Certain legal regimes are depicted as separate legal systems, working 
in operationally closed environments due to the autonomy of their 
secondary rules. 
(2) Certain rules or collection of rules are portrayed as a constitutional 
umbrella, which forms the constraining rim of the single 
international legal system. 
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(3) Systemic ontology is of peripheral importance; instead pragmatic 
technical approaches how to deal with the issues arising from 
diversification is developed.  
 
It might seem like these different approaches have nothing in common, 
however the arguments can instead be structured in a different way to 
expose that the approaches are really reactions to one another: 
 
A. The existence of self-contained regimes challenges the former 
concept and argues for systemic differentiation. (First approach) 
B. Systematics is reached through normative constitutionalization of 
international law. (Second approach) 
C. Systemic integration presents itself as the normative bridge between 
supposed self-contained systems and public international law, which 
supports the alleged international legal system and the concept of 
constitutionalization. (Third approach) 
D. The concept of differentiated systemic integrators criticizes the 
ability of systemic integration to bridge self-contained regimes and 
public international law, which undermines the constitutionalization 
of international law. (Third approach) 
 
There is no ‘winning side’ here, but rather different approaches with the 
ambition of shifting the international legal discourse in their own direction. 
Both constitutionalists and proponents of self-contained regimes are making 
normative statements of what international law either ought to be or is 
somewhat developing into. However, the different approaches point in two 
totally opposite directions. International law cannot both be striving towards 
universal constitutionalism and at the same time be falling apart. This rather 
supports the third available option; that international law is not a legal 
system, but rather a collection of binding or ‘semi-binding’ norms between 
states. 
 
The result of such a finding is perhaps not obviously unsatisfactory as it 
reflects the very definition of international law. However, if one quickly 
scratches on the surface of any textbook on international law it proves to be 
a rather devastating conclusion. Commentators who argue from a 
perspective where international law is considered a legal system with public 
international law as its firm fallback base will understand and interpret 
norms in the international sphere, as well as court rulings, in a public 
international law manner. Commentators of the other opinion are of course 
interpreting international law from a non-systemic position. This means that 
there are going to be indissoluble scholarly conflicts over the interpretation 
of international law, that are not only going to affect the progressiveness of 
the international legal field, but it will also blur the actual source of these 
conflicts; the basic premise on which the arguments relies, is international 
law a legal system or not? 
 
In concluding that international law, in accordance with its commonly 
known definition, is nothing more than a set of binding norms, one can 
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begin to ask what other types of binding norms that exist in the international 
sphere? Could it be that not only are the acts of a state the source of 
normative force, but also binding rules of other actors? In the next chapter 
the thesis will deal with the external transformation of the international 
normative environment. This chapter will discuss the transformation of 
international law, from its traditional monocentric state-consent based 
nature to a more polycentric de-Statalized nature. 
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4 The Polycentric Nature of the 
International Normative 
Environment 
This chapter intends to deal in short with international law in retrospect and 
how it has evolved from the traditional monocentric Westphalian nature of 
jus gentium to the polycentric nature of the multifunctional present state of 
the international normative environment. This development process has 
passed through different legal conceptual phases. From the 16th to the 18th 
century international law was believed to derive from nature and ascertained 
through human reason and as such binding on all states. As positivism 
begun to prevail over arguments of natural law in the 19th century, the 
binding nature of international law turned from being derived out of nature 
to being based on state consent. At the same time Austin’s command theory 
became widely accepted and law could only be conceived as binding if it 
was adopted and enforced by a sovereign.198 However, during the late 20th 
and early 21st century the idea of state-centrism and command theory have 
largely been contested and it is highly questionable if these former truisms 
provide a sufficient explanatory model of the much more functional-
oriented systems that can be seen today. 
 
In this chapter two different ideas on how to understand the nature of 
international law will be presented. First out is the classical state-centric 
approach. Then a theory that challenges this inherently monocentric 
approach will be presented, globalization theory, from which perspective the 
international sphere can be seen as a polycentric normative melting pot. 
4.1 The Classic State-centric Perspective 
The classical approach to international law always begins with references to 
the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The 
former treaty defined that the Prince had complete control over the internal 
affairs of the state,199 while the latter defined that states as legally free and 
equal in their international relationships.200 The most important treaties of 
the classical period all made reference to this notion of sovereignty and the 
classical idea of the state, words such as “high contracting parties” were 
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used and new treaties often reaffirmed older treaties for the maintenance of 
the international system’s coherence and unity.201  
 
These treaties defined that a state had a territory over which it exercised 
complete control, but also defined in which area control could be exercised 
and therefore also a conceptual border to which other states’ intentions 
could be measured. These concepts of boundaries, together with the later 
concept of neutrality, and the laws of occupation and of the high seas, 
reinforced the idea that international politics was essentially a struggle for 
power between states. Another category of rules that also reaffirmed the 
state-centrism of international law was the laws of diplomacy.202 
 
No matter if one adhered to the side of the naturalists or the positivists in 
describing international law, it was clear that international politics and law 
had two structural elements; the state, and the system of maintaining some 
international order. The rules of the classical era has since long been 
changed, but the body of theory forming international law still stands. 
According to Coplin this is due to the fact that, 
 
1. It legalized the existence of states and helped to define the actions 
necessary for the preservation of each and of the system as a whole.[..] 
2. It reinforced the ideas that vigilance, moderation, and flexibility are 
necessary for the protection of a system of competing states.[..] 
3. [..][I]nternational law established a legalized system of political payoffs by 
providing means to register gains and losses without creating a static 
system.203 
 
Traces of this classical period can be seen in contemporary international law 
as well, in what is referred to as public international law. As described in the 
previous chapter, this classical state-centric idea is very much alive still in 
the ontological debate over international law.  
 
The approach has also in international relations studies been described as 
the “society of states” model.204 From this perspective there exist two 
normative implications, (i) “states in international society are viewed as 
autonomous sources of moral ends, immune from external interference”, 
and (ii) ”there is no principle of distributive justice to which states are 
subject; they are presumed to be entitled to the resources they control”.205 
As such traditionally all rights flowing from international law are owed to 
states and no other actors. However, this perspective is increasingly 
criticized in international relations studies, as well as among international 
law scholars. The next sub-chapter will therefore be dedicated to investigate 
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how the contemporary international normative environment can be 
conceptualized. 
4.2 Challenges Posed by Globalized 
Polycentrism on the State-centric 
Perspective of International Law 
In 1997 a Columbia University professor foresaw that continuing decline of 
importance of the nation-state and the emergence of new global structures as 
well as norm regulating activities.206 Since, the world has really started to 
transform. One U.S. government representative captured this development 
quite well by noting that the 
 
[…] promise of rich governments to give 0.7 percent of their gross domestic 
product to poorer countries remains not only a promise, it is a relic, its actual 
dollars now dwarfed by significantly larger sums of private capital flows. 
Far-flung colonial empires have been replaced by corporations, the borderless 
empires of which are more suited to the nimble responses in a world that 
demands them.207 
 
Globalization is a contested phenomenon, which amplitude, implication and 
nature are widely unknown. In its widest form it has been described as “a 
multi-facetted process of expansion of human activities to the entire globe 
and assorted cognitive frames of reference”.208 The basic philosophy of 
globalization is that of a world with free cross-border capital flows, transfers 
of knowledge and information, labor mobility and the ”despatialization and 
internationalization of major entrepreneurial activities and the withering 
away of [the states] traditional spatial limitations”209 Walker describes the 
effect of this as an “exponential increase in the density of transboundary 
relations”.210 This is being conducted notwithstanding the conceptual legal 
borders of the classical state-centric perspective of international law. Garcia 
has stated that contemporary globalization 
 
[…] both requires, and permits, the re-casting of international law away from 
a “society of states” model and towards a model of global society and even 
global community. By effectively eliminating both time and space as factors 
in social interaction, globalization is changing the nature of global social 
                                                
206 See, Schachter, Oscar, ’The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for 
International Law’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 7-23, 
1998. 
207 King, Betty, ’The UN Global Compact: Responsibility for Human Rights, Labor 
Relations, and the Environment in Developing Nations’, Cornell International Law 
Journal, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 481-486, 2001, p. 484. 
208 Mégret, Frédéric, Globalization and International Law, Working Paper, 2008, Available 
at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1200782 [Accessed on: 2013-04-
09]. 
209 Tsoukalas, Konstantinos, ‘The Deregulation of Morals’, Project Of The Radical 
Imagination, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012, p. 7. 
210 Walker, Neil, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids:Mapping the Global 
Disorder of Normative Orders’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
pp. 373-396, 2008, p. 375. 
 48 
relations, intensifying the obsolescence of the “society of states” model, and 
demanding a fundamental change in the social theory of international law 
towards a global society of persons.211 
 
Other authors have also defined ‘Global society’ such as lifting relationships 
out of the strictly territorial into the ‘meta-territorial’ or ‘trans-
geographical’.212 Habermas has described the very same phenomenon in 
different terms, referring to ‘postnationalism’ focusing on the general 
decoupling of political processes from the state.213 These concepts are 
however used somewhat interchangeably.  
 
International relations scholars are arguing that the intensified economic 
integration has deepened the interdependence between states, which has 
effectively led to a situation of de-territorialization of international law. This 
contrast starkly with the aspiration of unity that is inherent in law and 
among jurists.214 However, the notion that globalization is primarily a result 
of economic transcendence is more frequently challenged as differing 
rationalities are entering the global stage, rationalities such as health, 
technology and sports to name a few.215 
 
International law scholars on the other hand have largely neglected the 
impact globalization has had on international law. Traditionally they have 
only focused on ‘official’ law, meaning law of states. This narrow focus, 
together with the fact that law has been conceived as being closely related 
with governmental coercive powers, have led to that any form of norms 
lacking coerciveness has not been conceived as law. Therefore ‘law’ has 
been seen as synonymous with ‘government’. However, globalization has 
forced scholars of international law to shift focus and accept that law cannot 
simply be understood as the commandments of governments and courts.216 
Instead we see a development of multiple normative international 
communities, where law does not reside solely on sovereign command, but 
is “constantly constructed through contest among various norm-generating 
communities”,217 meaning “all collective behavior entailing systematic 
understandings of our commitments to future worlds [can lay] equal claim 
to the word ‘law’”.218 
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As of April 2013 the Yearbook of International Organizations Online listed 
more than 34995219 active international governmental and non-
governmental organizations, all which to some extent are guiding normative 
and cognitive expectations and behavior of states, organizations and 
individuals in vastly different fields.220 Out of these, more than 140 are 
either controlling the implementation and/or settling disputes arising out of 
its interpretation and implementation.221 This rather messy situation gives 
rise to a multitude of official (so-called ‘hard law’), quasi-official and 
unofficial norms (so-called ‘soft law’), which are either coercively or 
persuasively enforced throughout multiple communities.222 Some would 
even argue that the soft law created in institutional settings guides the 
normative expectations of states to a much greater extent than bilateral or 
multilateral hard law treaties does in todays international sphere.223 Maybe 
the foremost example of such use of soft law is the UN Codes of 
Conduct.224 Backer is even arguing that: 
 
Contract replaces law; networks of relationships replace a political 
community; interest replaces territory; the regulated becomes the regulator.225 
 
Looking how the soft law created under the Code of Conduct guide the 
normative expectancy of transnational corporations in the way they 
conclude contracts, it can almost be seen as gaining the strength of hard law. 
This being done without the recognition of the traditional legal hierarchy of 
the state as the code does not contain any supranational regulatory body, 
which the original proposal did.226 Or as Luhmann argues: 
 
Seen from classical legal concepts – if we understand law to be sanctioned 
commandments of state organs, for example – we can hardly comprehend a 
change in the way in which law exists, or in what it is. Legal concepts of 
legal science which are directed at an either/or validity are not suitable for 
detecting the sublime shifts in the way in which law fulfills its function and is 
experience as meaningful.227 
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In a sense international law, in its broadest meaning, has so to speak become 
a “multicultural, multinational, and multidisciplinary legal phenomenon”.228 
In this environment differentiation into sub-functional spheres has become a 
necessary implication, creating a pluralistic norm-generating machinery, 
which effectively pierces the protective veil over state sovereignty. 
 
Many hold the EU as the foremost example of such punctuation where 
nearly all spatial boundaries have been erased and the direct effect of some 
decisions within the union’s competence even trumps national decision-
making.229 It has gone from being merely an economical community with 
peace as a guiding principle, to a sort of semi-federal state with deepened 
interdependence even in fields such as immigration and health. This sort of 
legal construction does not only challenge international law, it challenges 
the constitutional state idea as such and therefore the whole concept of 
quantifiable legal systems. In MacCormick’s view, in case of the EU and its 
member states, neither legal system is prioritized over the other, but rather 
runs parallel to each other without any of them being subordinate or 
externally coordinated by the other. They are rather, 
 
interacting systems, one of which constitutes in its own context and over the 
relevant range of topics a source of valid law superior to other sources 
recognized in each of the Member-state systems.230 
 
The EU is only one of a multiplicity of unconnected power centers in the 
traditionally international sphere. Normative power centers are not only 
flowing up to international organizations, like the EU, in the good faith of 
state actors. Also highly privatized normative systems are flowing out from 
states, with their own legislative bodies and implementation and settlement 
procedures.231 Very good examples of such exclusive normative operations 
are the lex mercatoria,232 the international social standards flowing from so 
called corporate social responsibility,233 Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers234 and the International Standardization Organization, 
to name a few.235 The normative regime developed around the control over 
the Internet is especially interesting from this point of view as Internet is 
inherently an a-geographical phenomenon. As the spatial dichotomy of 
national/international can no longer be upheld, the notion of a quantified 
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one international legal system can no longer be retained, as it in principle is 
a systemic concept derived out of territory. Instead new ways of 
conceptualizing systems of legal norms has to be developed.  In the words 
of Prandini the international sphere has therefore gone through a 
morphogenesis, from absolute sovereignty into a 
 
[…] multilevel, concatenated network of diverse forces, resources, actors and 
interests’ within a globalising world containing ‘many forms of authority, 
many shades of legitimacy, diverse aspects of accountability and complex 
arrangements of partial or divisible sovereignty.236 
 
Or in the words of Agnew: 
 
We cannot meaningfully apply the orthodox conception of sovereignty to the 
conditional exercise of relative, limited, and partial powers that local, 
regional, national, international, and nonterritorial communities and actors 
now exert.237 
4.3 Conclusion 
The purpose of outlining the evolution of international law in this manner is 
to make the reader understand that the notion of state sovereignty is not as 
absolute or static as one might think. The classic perception that 
international law is exclusively a state-centric conception is challenged by 
new theories on how to understand what is guiding the evolving global 
community. In the light of globalization it is no longer viable to speak of 
states as wholly autonomous and free from being bound by non-consensual 
norms and outside interference. Furthermore, the binding nature of norms 
not deriving from any statal source must be perceived as equally binding as 
its statal counterparts. Since there is no other binding feature of those norms 
deriving from a statal source than the normative and cognitive expectancies 
of the states those norms are purported to bind, due to sovereign equality, 
the same is equally true for norms not deriving from any statal source, as 
long as these non-statal norms performs the same normative and cognitive 
tasks as statal norms. It is therefore not constructive to speak in terms of 
national/international and public/private but rather in the sense of 
functional/dysfunctional. This type of dichotomy is wholly unfamiliar to 
classical legal theory. 
 
Furthermore, these deep structural changes to the international sphere posed 
by globalized polycentrism are most definitely a major contributing factor to 
the anxiety described under chapter 2. The stabilizing function of law 
between different interests of society framed in political language cannot 
cope with the proliferation of actors and interests that exist in the modern 
globalized world, since these interests does not speak the language of 
politics. Therefore the constitutionalization theories mentioned above 
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become mere symbols since they cannot neutralize the many different 
normative forces within the international sphere. 
 
If one recapitulates some of the theories depicted above these are really 
incapable of coping with this relatively newly identified polycentrism. 
Institutions such as the UN are strictly statal organizations, and as such do 
not identify other international actors than states. Furthermore, the supposed 
superior norms of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes might become a 
theory in which international law can be understood. However, there are 
currently no mechanisms under which other actors can be guided by those 
superior norms.238 
 
This means that international law in its jus gentium sense can be 
characterized as a narrow perspective in conceptualizing the international 
normative environment. Polycentrism requires the referential horizon of 
legal scholars to be broadened and as such it might be more suitable to 
move away from the old concepts and introduce new conceptual tools in 
which norms in the international sphere can be understood. As such the 
terminology of the thesis will change, as international law it not considered 
a suitable term to describe the contemporary nature of the international 
normative environment, instead the more suitable term global law will be 
used hereinafter.239 
 
In the age of global law, the idea of an all-inclusive constitutional divide of 
law and politics derived from the territorial-state concept of a constitution 
cannot suffice in acting as limit-setter to the transnational processes that 
occurs within different global social processes. The thesis will therefore 
move on to present a theory, which might be able to better explain the 
systemic nature of global law. 
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5 Societal Constitutionalism – 
An Approach to Systematize 
Global Law 
International law is by many seen as a systemic anomaly in relation to the 
traditional concept of legal systems, but most still believes that international 
law is indeed a legal system. These commentators are of the opinion that 
they have found the answer to the question of the identity of international 
law. However, from the above discussion it seems like these theories has 
reached their explanatory limits, especially in view of the rise of globalized 
legal polycentrism. In this chapter global law will be conceptualized with 
the help of a different theory, namely that of Societal Constitutionalism. 
This theory is based on the late German system theorist Niklas Luhmann’s 
theory on Autopoietic Social Systems.  
 
The theory of self-(re)productive systems, autopoietic systems, was first 
developed by two Chilean biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela, in the mid 20th century. Autopoiesis (< Greek: autos = self, poiein = 
to produce) was a way to describe the workings of a biological organism, 
with cells that reproduce themselves solely within themselves. Or as the two 
biologists themselves phrased it: 
 
The autopoietic organization is defined as a unity by a network of 
productions of components which (i) participate recursively in the same 
network of productions of components which produced these components, 
and (ii) realize the network of productions as a unity in the space in which the 
components exist.240 
 
Reproduction of a biological autopoietic system is a process of division, 
where for example the cells unity is fragmented and the fragment carries the 
same autopoietic unity as the original cell unit.241 The autopoietic system 
should be distinguished from the allopoietic (< Greek: allos = other; poiein 
= to produce) systems in which the elements of the system are reproduced 
by something outside the system. The autopoietic system is so to say an 
operatively closed system. Not in the sense that it is isolated from its 
context, but rather that it’s operating features are isolated from outside 
interference.242 
 
Luhmann later translated the theory of autopoietic systems not only to apply 
on biological organisms, but as a general theory, also applying to the social 
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domain, as well as on social sub-domains such as law, politics, economics, 
art and even love. Luhmann’s basic assumption was that social systems, in 
the same way as biological systems, could be conceptualized as systems that 
reproduced their own elements on the basis of their own elements.243 
Society to Luhmann was tremendously complex, and as such “cannot be 
described other than by a complex theory”.244 However, the complexity of 
his theory makes it ideal to describe the multiplexity of contemporary 
polycentric global law, as he firmly believed that autopoietic system theory 
would provide a better description of the relationships between different 
systems of society. This since autopoietic systems theory, unlike legal 
theory, has guiding principles on how to determine the difference between a 
system and its environment, where identity is not a defining factor, but 
distinction is, and it is only through distinguishing A from B that makes 
observation of the quantitative units of A and B possible.245 In that way 
systems theory becomes a bridge between legal theory and social theory, “a 
reflection of law in social theory”.246 
 
Due to the complexity of Luhmann’s theory it is necessary to introduce at 
least some of the core components of his theory in a separate chapter as an 
introduction to societal constitutionalism. 
5.1 Core Concepts of Luhmann’s 
Autopoietic Social System Theory 
According to Luhmann modern society is an international society in which 
only one single social system exists.247 This overarching social system is the 
sum of all its sub-systems, such as politics, economics and law, and their 
reproductive elements. These systems can, if certain features are met, 
become autopoietic social systems. 
 
The reproductive element of such autopoietic social systems is 
communication, a type of communication that cannot exist outside the 
system itself.248 This might be difficult to comprehend at first, but it is quite 
easy to conceptualize that one cannot communicate with the environment 
outside of society itself, which defines the very same. In Luhmann’s words: 
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Those who try to communicate with their telephones (‘stop ringing, phone!’) 
misunderstand systems; one can communicate not to but only with the help of 
a telephone.249 
 
It does not mean that we cannot communicate about e.g. the physical world 
and what it entails, but that communication is made within the realms of 
society, not with the physical world itself. However, the existence of the 
physical world, the environment, is a precondition for communicating about 
it. 
 
Furthermore, for a social system, such as law, to reach a state of unity it 
need to differentiate itself from the intra-social environment it 
communicates in. Mere communicative participation in the autopoiecy of 
society does only make it a partial system of society. The unity of a system 
is only preserved if the system produces and reproduces the communication 
by its own operations, so called operational closure.250 It does not mean that 
the system survives in a vacuum, as the concept of operational closure does 
not imply that a system works in isolation. Instead it is dependent on its 
environment, which effectively defines the boundaries of the unit that we 
conceive as a system.251 Therefore Luhmann argues that it is required to 
distinguish between operational closure and causal closure; the former is a 
system, which is open to its environment, while the latter lives in isolation 
of the same.252 While other theories depend on external functions to define 
all the distinctions and concepts creating a conceptual unit, autopoietic 
systems through its self-reproduction produces all distinctions and concepts 
it needs. The quantifiable unity is simply the autopoiesis of the system, 
which also means that structures and elements can survive only as long as 
the system maintains its autopoiesis,253 Or as Luhmann phrases it himself, 
“[o]nly the law itself can say what law is”.254 
 
For a system to differentiate itself and become operatively closed from its 
communicative environment Luhmann is arguing that: 
 
The differentiation of a legal system is fundamentally based on the 
distinguishability of normative and cognitive expectations.[..]Legal systems 
use this difference to combine the closure of recursive self-production and 
the openness of their relation to the environment. In other words law is a 
normatively closed but cognitively open system.255 
 
Normative closure means that only the legal system can generate the 
elements of law and their legal normative quality, which is created and 
recreated, moment to moment, element to element. Or if one will, from case 
to case, norm to norm, which means that normativity is created in the 
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operation of one case, then recreated and applied in the next.256 This is the 
function of law. Cognitive openness on the other hand is necessary as the 
constant reproduction of the system is dependent on determining if the 
conditions of the elements in a situation have been met or not.257 However, 
it is highly important to note that cognitive openness does not threaten the 
autonomy of the system, as the external reference made by the system is 
entirely controlled by the operation of the system.258  
 
This also means that the system of law differentiates between necessary 
conditions and unnecessary conditions, such as moral values, and the 
assessment of what is relevant and not is again determined by the system.259 
This distinction of relevancy is done on the basis of a certain code, a binary 
code, which in the case of law is legal/illegal, which is a differentiation 
made by observation. Luhmann calls such observation, observing the 
observers, or secondary order observation.260 
 
Relations to other systems are maintained through what Luhmann calls 
structural coupling. Coupling mechanism is structural “if a system 
presupposes certain features of its environment on an ongoing basis and 
relies on them structurally”.261 From Luhmann’s perspective law is for 
example structurally coupled with politics through the constitution,262 and as 
such “law binds politics through legally regulated processes, and politics 
uses law as an instrument for achieving its ‘goals’”.263 He calls this mutual 
irritation. The transition into functionally differentiated social sub-systems 
requires further structural couplings also to other parts of the entirety of the 
social system to maintain their autopoietic autonomy.264 However, for this 
thesis the structural coupling of the constitution will suffice. 
 
Luhmann’s conception of the constitution therefore differs greatly from the 
traditional understanding of the very same found in legal theory. In these 
theories the constitution is merely a positive statute law, which validates the 
enactment of other positive laws and as such is autological.265 As he phrases 
it, “[t]he traditional legal hierarchy of divine law, eternal law, or variable 
law, and positivistic law vanished. […] Instead, the constitution proclaimed 
that the responsibility for all law lies with the legal system”.266 
 
Important to note is that the legal and political system are not by their nature 
separated social systems, it was only with the introduction of the principle 
of separation of powers, and with that the functional differentiation of the 
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systems of law and politics, that the separation begun to occur.267 The 
autologic paradox (what validates the constitution?)268 is according to 
Luhmann, not a distinction of the top-bottom type hierarchy, but of the 
inside-outside type, where a system through structural couplings resolves 
the paradoxes through its own operation. This means that the paradox of 
self-reference in the legal system is resolved due to the structural coupling 
of the constitution and the political solutions269 that the constitution 
provides. This necessitates the existence of a state, a constitutional state. 
State is here used in a very wide sense, meaning a state, an organization or 
institution.270 However, the solution to the autological paradox necessarily 
means that the existence of autopoietic legal systems do not correspond with 
what we ordinarily perceived as legal systems. It presupposes a reasonably 
developed ‘state’ in which the constitution has differentiated the political 
and legal system to such an extent that they are no longer interdependent 
upon each other. 
 
From a purely Luhmannian perspective the state is therefore a necessary 
component for law to become an autopoietic social system. The primary 
differentiation in the international sphere however is not into functional sub-
systems, but is instead segmented into formally equal nation states. The 
functional differentiation is therefore only secondary, and not all-inclusive, 
based on the binary code of center/periphery or inclusiveness/exclusiveness. 
Some parts of the world might therefore be excluded from the 
communications of some functional sub-systems, while being included in 
others.271 As such, international law does not have the capability to 
differentiate itself as an autopoietic social system from other social sub-
systems, such as the political system of international relations. Thus, 
international law is not fully operationally closed and the autopoiesis cannot 
completely be established.272 
 
For the next chapter it is however important to keep in mind Luhmann’s 
theoretical framework concerning autopoiecy. 
5.2 Societal Constitutionalism and Global 
Law 
That Luhmann himself did not believe that rules in the international sphere 
formed a single quantified legal systemic unit does not mean per se that 
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norms in the international sphere, or global law, lacks systematics. Instead 
an investigation on how rules in the international sphere have established 
themselves in international social sub-systems must be conducted. The 
differentiation has not occurred according to the segmentary differentiation 
into nation-states that Luhmann proposes, but rather into what Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner is referring to as systems that are: 
 
[P]rocess based, deriving simply from the modes of connection between legal 
operations, which transfer binding legality between even highly 
heterogeneous legal orders. […] Legal unity is redirected away from 
normative consistency towards [a state of] operative ‘inter-legality’.273 
 
Constitutionalization in this sense is neither strictly legal, nor political; it 
should instead be understood in a sociological sense, as a “tool of 
integration of legal norms into real life processes”.274 Therefore one also 
needs to move away from the strictly hierarchical way of looking upon law 
and constitutionalism and embrace the heterarchical nature of contemporary 
global law, as well as starting from the idea that “not every polity has a 
written constitution, but every polity has constitutional norms”.275 
 
With the advancement and creation of highly autonomous international 
organizations, regulatory and normative regimes, the state-centric logic of 
the past with territorially differentiated legal systems, only coupled with 
each other through the contractual law of the international legal order, have 
been overtaken by sectorial fragmentation, or in other words, globalized 
polycentrism. The impact upon international law is that of internally 
differentiated systems each with their “issue-specific policy-arenas”,276 and 
each with a delegated impartial authority to interpret and apply the issue-
specific rules, “acting under the constraint of the rules”.277 These non-
territorially based differentiated systems are so to say autopoietically 
validating their own existence within their own policy-arenas. Looking upon 
legal systems from this point of view, one can move beyond the 
national/international dichotomy and instead see that the sectorial 
differentiation of global society is making legal regimes claim jurisdiction 
not along territorial, but rather along issue-specific lines.278 
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This position has been criticized by Paulus, who argues that although 
special regimes, as he calls them, operate in accordance within their own 
functional rationality, states still maintain the position as “the only 
legitimate legislator” and “the main bearer of responsibility for breaches of 
international law”, and therefore, a “new global law over or above state 
consent will have to wait for another day”.279 As such there exist a 
democratic deficit within these specialized spheres and the democratic glue 
that keeps them from becoming illegitimate is the “common values and 
decision-making-procedures” of public international law.280  
 
Although Paulus is right in stating states are the main legislator of 
traditional international law, he neglects the fact that non-consensual, non-
statal, based obligations arises on a regular basis. In criticizing such an 
order, he implicitly criticizes the institutionalization of the international 
sphere altogether. To exemplify such non-consent based obligations there 
are the Security Council resolutions,281 the direct-effect doctrine of the 
EU,282 and the concept of evolutive interpretation within the ECHR,283 
which can be argued is not entirely exclusive of the ECtHR but also found 
within the case law of the ICJ284 and the WTO Arbitration Tribunal.285 
Other examples that apply within the sphere of public international law are 
to a certain extent customary international law.286 According to the ICJ 
customary international law is binding on all states in “that the conduct of 
states […] in general, […][are] consistent with such rules”.287 Another 
example in public international law is that of ‘implied powers’ of 
international organizations.288 The foremost example is maybe nonetheless 
the emergence of something, which can be termed social practice, which 
have been identified by the ECtHR. It refers to the practice of non-state 
actors, which effect the obligation of states, due to “increased social 
acceptance”289 or “major social changes”.290 
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Furthermore, with the transit from a state-centric to polycentric normative 
environment, as described in chapter 4.2, these normative systems in which 
the multiplicity of international legal and semi-legal actors engage in norm 
creating, norm interpreting as well as norm enforcing activities, it is no 
longer appropriate to speak in terms of international law in the sense that it 
is interchangeable with jus gentium. States are no longer the sole 
responsible actors of the international sphere and concepts such as global 
law appear more suitable to describe the recent normative developments in 
the international sphere. These non-territorially defined systems are largely 
developing through self-regulating processes and produce normative content 
without the formal legislative processes of the state, but rather through 
decentralized processes of interdependence.291 These 
 
[…]organized sectors, in which decision-making procedures find some 
degree of formalization, could play the role of the center of the legal system 
(its courts), without being bound by national sovereignty.292 
 
The process of differentiation between normative systems however 
necessitates a kind of referential horizon, a constitution. In conceptualizing 
international law from a constitutional perspective, the constitutionalization 
theories discussed above does not reach far beyond the first criteria of any 
definition of the constitutional concept. One such example is Walker who 
claims that the following seven criteria need to be present for the existence 
of a constitution: 
 
1) the development of an explicit constitutional discourse and constitutional 
self-consciousness; 
2) a claim to foundational legal authority, or sovereignty, whereas 
sovereignty is not viewed as absolute; 
3) the delineation of a sphere of competences; 
4) the existence of an organ internal to the polity with interpretative 
autonomy as regards the meaning and the scope of the competences; 
5) the existence of an institutional structure to govern the polity; 
6) rights and obligations of citizenship, understood in a broad sense; 
7) specification of the terms of representation of the citizens in the polity.293 
 
However, when observing global law, institutionalized regimes such as the 
EU, the ILO, and the WTO undoubtedly reach far across the board, with 
“technocratic and functionally-oriented judiciary”.294 Privatized normative 
regimes such as lex mercatoria are one example where traditional legislative 
and political processes are bypassed and normativity are based on social 
constitutional narratives, as described in chapter 4. It does not only lack the 
political sovereign of the nation-state, is also lacks most forms of sovereign 
rationality;295 instead it speaks the language of contracts.296 Or as Teubner 
frames it: 
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Instead of referring to a national constitution, the lex mercatoria calls upon a 
rich fund of relevant non-legal material - international trade and transport 
customs and commercial practices - that developed in the chaotic 
environment of the world market. 297 
 
With this level of constitutionalization within certain functional areas of the 
bodies of norms that exist in the international sphere, and with the lack 
hereto of the same within the constitutional theories of international law, 
one cannot but conclude that functional internal systemic differentiation has 
been reached within certain issue-specific and spatially defined areas of 
international law. These systems do not only display their own autonomous 
legal bodies, but also a high level of socio-political autonomy. The 
autonomy of the above-mentioned spheres not only shows a highly coherent 
body of norms, but also operates by reproducing their own elements of law 
on the basis of their own operational elements, in legal theory called 
secondary rules. As such, these systems showcase a high degree of 
distinguishability of the normative and cognitive expectations of the 
systems, effectively differentiating them from their environments and 
consequently becoming operationally closed.298 The distinguishability 
allows the system to pursue and strengthen its own normative rational. 
 
As operationally closed systems have the ability and the necessity to 
structurally couple with their environment, based on the systems own 
operational elements, and this in this case is conducted on the basis of the 
binary code constitutional/unconstitutional, the irritations of the 
environment is being examined against the societal constitution. Such 
environments span from the issue-specific political system to the inter-
systemic legal environment it resides in. The latter structural coupling 
explains the ability of these internally differentiated systemic entities to 
adopt norms not previously communicated within the system, but 
communicated in their other systems in its environment. 
 
This structural coupling is, however, according to Paulus, due to the lack of 
an all-encompassing legal regime, the reason why specialized regimes are 
necessitated to resort to fallback on rules of public international law.299 
However, such a claim misses its target as the fallback on rules that exists 
outside the internally differentiated systemic legal entity is not being 
conducted due to normative requirements of anything outside the system, 
but on the basis of the internally differentiated systemic entities own 
operational elements. The argument is furthermore based on the notion that 
norms in the international sphere are hierarchically classified, while the 
truth rather lies in those norms being heterarchical. 
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Furthermore, the fact that an internally differentiated system works in 
accordance with the same binary code, legal/illegal or 
constitutional/unconstitutional, as other similar legal systemic entities do, 
makes these different systems to only seemingly belong to one singular 
fragmented system. Conversely, this also allows the different systems to 
mutually observe each other. However, this will not lead to a situation of 
subsequent coherent conclusions, due to the fact that these conflicts are not 
mere conflicts of policy, but distinct social rationality conflicts.300 These 
conflicts can never be solved by externally imposing limits on the internally 
differentiated systems, like with that of universal constitutionalism. They 
must be solved internally, guided by the rationale of the systems themselves, 
or the system risks collapsing by loosing its internal logic. As such the 
proposed conflict resolution mechanisms of international legal scholars 
inevitably fail due to the reductionism and oversimplification of these 
rationality conflicts.301 Maybe the four most prominent clashes of this kind 
is: 
 
1. Norms of two international regimes conflict in the same case. The 
foremost example would be the conflict between the human rights 
and humanitarian law.302 
2. A court in one international regime is faced with a question of 
whether to use the norms of another regime. The primary example 
being a WTO panel confronted with norms of international 
environmental law.303 
3. The same legal question is raised before different arbitral 
institutions. The main example is the MOX-planet case.304 
4. Different international tribunals interpret the same legal norm in a 
different way. The ICJ and the ICTY regarding the conditions for 
attributing non-state actor behavior to a state.305 
 
Legal qualitative unity is not possible within the functional differentiated 
legal systems in the global society, only compatibility is, as the supposed 
fragmentation does not originate in law, but within the social contexts it 
resides in.306 The only way to limit the impact one system has over another 
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in the event of such conflicts are what Teubner calls the constitutional 
principle of sustainability. This principle requires the sub-system to 
“prevent destructive tendencies and avoid the environmental damage [it] 
cause” through self-limitation.307 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The societal constitutional theory moves far away from the classical legal 
theoretical understanding of constitutionalism. Essentially it describes self-
referential differentiated social systems that functions without having to 
address any sovereign tasks. It presents itself more as a constitutional theory 
on the development of a global civil society, one in which states are not 
excluded but rather an actor of a special character. The theory entails many 
aspects, which cannot be described with traditional legal theory, especially 
how social interactions between communicating actors functions. This is 
where Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic social systems is of great 
importance. 
 
It is although questionable if such a theory can be all-inclusive in 
interpreting the emergence of global law. Luhmann himself did not believe 
that the international sphere could be described as an autopoietic social 
system with functionally differentiated systems such as law and politics. 
However, Luhmann failed due to having the same urge as many 
international law scholars have, the urge of a single quantified international 
legal system. The segmentary differentiation and exclusion of certain state 
actors within the legal-political sphere that Luhmann refers to, rather 
supports the argument of a sectorial function-based membership-approach 
into differentiated legal systems. These spheres are not in any way 
determined territorially, but instead along issue-specific lines, as such they 
cater for audiences with special interests and special ethos.  
 
A critical voice raised against the theory of societal constitutionalism is 
Wahl who claim that this approach “enjoy discovering the new so much that 
they have no attention left for already existing achievements”.308 Although 
law to some extent legitimizes its existence through the hierarchical and 
recurring character of norms, decisions and rulings, the explanatory limits 
imposed on traditional legal theory by the existence of a global society 
cannot be neglected. Legal theory is territorially defined and as such cannot 
describe the de-territorialized state of heterarchical polycentric global law. 
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6 Summary of Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis has partially been to investigate the systemic nature of 
what we today commonly refer to as international law. In doing so, a 
doctrinal analysis has been conducted to understand the relevancy of 
discussing this subject matter. The findings of this analysis firmly 
acknowledge the fact that there is no common ground among academics 
whether or not we can conceive international law as a systemic unit or not. 
This led to an analysis of the approaches taken in the doctrine to systematize 
international law as a single unit. The result of which will be presented in 
the following sub-chapter along with the author’s own arguments whether 
these approaches are substantially supported by the case law of international 
courts and tribunals as well as in light of recent developments in the 
international normative environment. 
6.1 The Systemic Nature of International 
Law 
Currently there is a pluralism of universal constitutional theories as well as 
theories that are critical to universal constitutionalism, which aspirate to 
become the hegemonic explanatory theory on the systemic nature of 
international law. Some of the more prominent of these theories have been 
presented in this thesis to elaborate on the answer to the question; is 
international law a legal system?  
 
For the following analysis it is of importance to keep in mind what has been 
explained in chapter 4, namely that the traditional concept of international 
law in light of globalization and normative polycentrism is increasingly 
being challenged. The origin of international normative and cognitive 
expectancies no longer rests solely on the shoulders of the nation-states, but 
also on other communicating actors. Thus it seems like a transfer of 
concepts is needed to fully understand how legal, or if one will, normative 
systems are formed and maintained.  
 
The universal constitutional theories that are seeking support within 
traditional legal theory, namely institutional and normative 
constitutionalism, are not as such bad per se at explaining the workings of 
international law in its jus gentium sense. However, to make use of these 
theories it is necessary to delimit the observable scope through observing 
the international normative environment from a more narrow perspective - 
as binding rules and norms between states. This due to the fact that it is not 
possible to consider all international rules and norms with these theories, 
since they by and large only recognize certain rules and norms as ‘binding’. 
As concluded in chapter 4.2, not only traditional ‘hard law’ is guiding the 
normative and cognitive expectations of its recipients, but also ‘soft law’ of 
various grade and origin has enforcing and/or persuasive power in modern 
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global law. Accordingly, normative and institutional constitutionalism 
cannot only be challenged internally by referring to weaknesses within their 
legal theoretical arguments, as has been done throughout chapter 3, but also 
externally by the ongoing shift in sources of normative content. 
 
Beginning with the external challenges, looking upon the universal 
constitutional theories the theory of H.L.A. Hart is one of the foremost-cited 
legal theories by international law practitioners and scholars in both the 
debate over fragmentation and constitutionalization. Hart’s union of primary 
and secondary rules, guided by a rule of recognition, a meta-norm applied 
by the officials of the system is effectively disregarding any norms arising 
from any other source than official bodies of the legal system, namely 
states. Accordingly, legal scholars adhering to Hart’s theory, or any of the 
later theorists who have developed Hart’s theory, have reached the ultimate 
end of their explanatory road in search for legal unity of global law. As 
normative regimes flows both up and out from states, there is no longer an 
identifiable set of ‘officials’ that in accordance with the rule of recognition 
can identify and apply international norms in a systemic fashion. Even in 
introducing Raz’s distinguishing test, which also has to do with the internal 
structure of a system, where the principle of efficaciousness is the excluding 
factor in comparing systems, one cannot but conclude that the supposed 
universal system created and maintained under either institutional or 
normative constitionalization cannot be considered as efficacious as other 
normative sub-regimes in the international sphere.  
 
Moving on to the internal challenges of the universal constitutionalization 
theories, which are challenges solely posed within international law itself. 
Institutional and normative constitutionalization is to certain extent 
counteracting theories where the supportive argument of one, undermines 
the other. However, as stated before the most dominant of the two are 
normative constitutionalization and thus this conclusion will continue 
referring only to this theory. If one observes how international courts and 
tribunals are acting in their interpretive practice, there is certainly a distinct 
discrepancy between what the constitutionalists are stating and what courts 
and tribunals actually concludes. With the supposed constitutional norms 
being a mere academic or political canon without serious juridical 
implications for those who violate them, it is questionable if such norms, 
and in extension the constitutional theories, can have more bearing than 
being just a discursive approach to influence the future development of 
international law.  
 
The same discrepancies can be said to exist concerning the theoretical 
approaches surrounding self-contained legal regimes presented in chapter 
3.2. There are few, if any, proponents of the true form of self-contained 
legal regimes that are fully inseparable from falling back on the rules of 
public international law. For a regime like the EU to be fully self-contained 
it seems like it has to take over all the features, or at least all the effects 
directed from the international sphere upon the internal workings of the 
regime, from the nation state. However, in such a situation it is doubtful if 
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one could speak of the EU as an organization of states, but rather a state in 
itself, or at least a federation of states, as the international legal subject 
representing its federated states. The same applies to other regimes. They 
can never fully relate to the issues brought before them as the regulatory 
treaties are functionally defined while issues of conflicts rarely corresponds 
solely to that of the function the regime holds. Observing self-containment 
from this perspective, the dichotomy of Statal/non-Statal and 
national/international becomes a necessary component in quantifying a legal 
systemic unit. 
 
Moreover, the efforts of unifying the application of international law in 
different regulatory regimes through juridical technical approaches, as 
presented in chapter 3.3, does not provide an answer to the ontological 
question. As argued, there is a distinction between quantified and qualified 
unity. These juridical technical approaches do indeed provide tools for the 
legal applier to apply primary rules consistently with public international 
law or other international norms. However, as discussed under the chapter 
on differentiated systemic integrators, there are certain situations where 
norms are irreconcilable of nature and as long as these rationality clashes 
exist, uniformity can never be said to exist without a universal appellate 
body without a functionally defined jurisdiction, but rather one over all 
international legal matters. 
 
The lesson learned from the above raised issues with the concept of self-
contained legal regimes, is that for an international legal systemic unit at all 
to exist within the confines of traditional legal theory, the dichotomy of 
national/international must be avoided. As long as there are sovereign states 
of an equal footing, there is no possibility of creating a legal systemic unit 
within the international sphere. The differentiation of national/international 
is indispensable for national systemic unity, but at the same time it renders 
international systemic unity impossible. This due to the fact that the 
stabilizing task of the legal system between conflicting rationalities does not 
function in an international sphere containing actors which, (1) are 
sovereign and only a member of the part of international law that it deems 
desirable, with the possible although doubtful exception of norms jus cogen 
and obligations erga omnes; and (2) actors, such as transnational 
corporations and transnational non-governmental organizations which 
international law is not intended to regulate but still form normative and 
cognitive expectancies among international actors. 
 
As such, not only is the constitutionalization discourse suffering from 
internal legal theoretical inconsistencies, but also it cannot describe the 
current systemic status of international law. Instead what is being described 
is what these authors believe the systemic nature of international law ought 
to be. In their hegemonic ambitions they furthermore often fail to 
distinguish between a unit and unity. International law cannot be 
fragmenting if international law is not a system, and the systemic nature of 
international law cannot be proven solely with the help of creating 
coherency. Therefore, the simple answer to the question ‘is international law 
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a legal system?’ within the confines of legal theory according to the findings 
of the thesis, is, ‘No’. It is rather politics phrased in the language of law. 
 
In this situation international law then becomes nothing more than a generic 
term of the many norms that exists outside the national sphere of nation-
states. From such an abstracted perspective, international law can never be 
fragmenting. International law is rather something roughly defined 
negatively as norms that exist outside the national sphere. As long as the 
dichotomy of national/international survives, the conceptual unity of 
international law is retained. However, the fact that international law is 
considered a conceptual unit does not mean that international law 
constitutes a legal system. 
6.2 Understanding the Systemic Nature of 
Global Law 
While coming to the conclusion that international law cannot be considered 
a legal system, what is remaining to be answered is whether systematics is 
at all to be found within the international sphere. As presented under chapter 
6.1 the international normative environment has in recent years been 
transformed from being mainly a contractual, and to some extent non-
consensual, legal regime between states to a multiplex normative 
environment. Polycentric globalization has led to the emergence of a 
pluralism of transnational actors and organization, which has led to the 
development of numerous private normative regimes. Together with the fact 
that international law as well has, if one will, fragmented into functional 
regimes which are working in accordance with a different rationale then that 
of public international law, a shift of concepts are needed. This thesis has 
argued for a transfer from the rather restrictive concept of international law 
to the broader concept of global law. 
 
To understand the systemic mechanism of global law, a different theory has 
been introduced, a theory based in Niklas Luhmann’s Autopoietic Systems 
Theory, namely Societal Constitutionalism. This theory stands out from the 
rest of the presented theories in this thesis as it pertains to explain the inner 
workings of the broader concept of global law within global society. It 
focuses on the fact that modern global society is, due to fragmentation, 
being separated into functional systems dealing with highly specialized 
fields of interest. Not only are new communicative actors entering the 
global stage, but new functional imperatives are also being developed for 
each of the functional systems. These imperatives find their base in the 
rationale of the differentiated system as such and are to large extent 
confined to their issue-specific policy-arenas, like individual states, trade, 
environment, human rights and the Internet, to name a few. Within their 
own confines they produce and reproduce their communication by their own 
operations, what Luhmann calls operational closure.  
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So does this mean the end of the nation-state? No, states still maintain their 
position of ultimate authority, the main actor of international law, as well as 
being a sub-system of its own within global law. However, the restricting 
semantics of territoriality must be let go of. Neither can the narrow 
understanding of legal rules as being merely rules that authorize or prohibits 
certain behavior suffice. With globalized processes that transcends national 
borders and involve actors other than states, it is no longer viable to 
understand and observe law if confined to the dichotomies of 
national/international and public/private. This foremost due to that there are 
far too many global systems that do not communicate with the power 
medium of politics, as within states, but rather that of function. To take two 
examples of such functions there is the lex mercatoria and the organs 
controlling the inter-connecting nodes of the Internet, two typically a-
territorial systems, which fits bad within the confines of state-centric legal 
theoretical understandings. These systems are spontaneously producing 
norms without relying on any formal legislative processes like that of the 
state, however at the same time they self-regulate in a social evolutive 
manner with the help of their of judiciaries. This of course raises serious 
concerns about democratic legitimacy within these internally differentiated 
systems. However, from the perspective of quantifying autopoietic systems, 
democratic deficiency is not an issue. 
 
Without an apex or a center, the international sphere is without an authority 
in sight to gather up the fragments created by these social processes. 
However, the differentiated spheres, or fragments, are by their operational 
closure distinguishing themselves from other fragments. Through processes 
along sectorial defined lines, communicating actors are largely acting under 
the constraint posed by the norms that exist within these internally 
differentiated systems. Owing to processes that are both socio-legal as well 
as socio-political, these systems are indeed constituitionalizing themselves 
creating the well much needed referential horizon to autopoietically 
reproduce themselves solely within themselves. This is being conducted 
without the traditional political sovereign of the state, but interestingly it 
also lacks other sovereign rationalities. However, by distinguishing 
themselves from their intra-social environment, these systems effectively 
reach the state of autopoiecy, or as quantified units. 
 
While not all norms in the international sphere are systematized under 
internally differentiated systemic units, many have been, and as such there is 
a pluralism of differentiated legal systems that exist within the international 
sphere. This inevitably leads to conflicts among sub-systems. These 
rationality conflicts that constantly occur in the international sphere are of 
the irreconcilable sort. Unlike traditional legal theory, where it is believed 
that solutions can be found within legal methodology, the response among 
the internally differentiated systems is to restrain themselves from pursuing 
their rational to the extent that the environment of the system is caused 
enough damage that it might undermine itself. The totality of international 
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sub-legal systems is so to speak to paraphrase Emil Durkheim, living in a 
form of “organic solidarity” with each other.309 
                                                
309 Durkheim, Émile, The division of labor in society, 6. pr., Free Press, New York, 
1966[1964], p. 181. 
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